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Security audit

Quick Intel Token Security Scanner

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate paid token-scanning skill, but it gives agents broad permission to trigger paid wallet-backed scans and includes payment-signing examples that under-validate what the wallet signs.

Install only if you are comfortable sending token addresses and chains to Quick Intel and using an x402 payment wallet. Prefer a managed wallet or a dedicated low-balance wallet, never a main wallet key, and require the agent to show the cost and ask before each scan. If using the manual signing examples, add strict checks for expected amount, token contract, recipient, chain, and EIP-712 domain before signing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:158
Finding

Unvalidated Server-Controlled Payment Authorization

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:158-179, 190-199; duplicated in Reference.md:174-195, 203-212 and the ethers.js flow at Reference.md:254-276, 285-294
Vulnerability Type: Unvalidated payment parameters from an external service
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

javascript
// Step 2: Find preferred network in accepts array
const networkInfo = paymentRequired.accepts.find(a => a.network === 'eip155:8453');
if (!networkInfo) throw new Error('Base network not available');

// Step 3: Sign EIP-712 TransferWithAuthorization
const nonce = keccak256(toHex(`${Date.now()}-${Math.random()}`));
const validBefore = BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600);

const signature = await account.signTypedData({
  domain: {
    name: networkInfo.extra.name,
    version: networkInfo.extra.version,
    chainId: 8453,
    verifyingContract: networkInfo.asset,
  },
  types: {
    TransferWithAuthorization: [
      { name: 'from', type: 'address' },
      { name: 'to', type: 'address' },
      { name: 'value', type: 'uint256' },
      { name: 'validAfter', type: 'uint256' },
      { name: 'validBefore', type: 'uint256' },
      { name: 'nonce', type: 'bytes32' },
    ],
  },
  primaryType: 'TransferWithAuthorization',
  message: {
    from: account.address,
    to: networkInfo.payTo,
    value: BigInt(networkInfo.amount),
    validAfter: 0n,
    validBefore,
    nonce,
  },
});

The resulting authorization repeats the same untrusted parameters:

javascript
const paymentPayload = {
  x402Version: 2,
  scheme: 'exact',
  network: 'eip155:8453',
  payload: {
    signature,
    authorization: {
      from: account.address,
      to: networkInfo.payTo,
      value: networkInfo.amount,
      validAfter: '0',
      validBefore: validBefore.toString(),
      nonce,
    },
  },
};

Technical Analysis

The manual EVM pay ...[truncated 3349 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Validate every payment term before invoking any signing operation:

  1. Require the network to equal the intended CAIP-2 identifier, such as eip155:8453.
  2. Require the chain ID to equal 8453 and reject inconsistent network or domain values.
  3. Compare networkInfo.asset against an immutable allowlist of official payment-token contracts for each supported network.
  4. Require networkInfo.amount to be exactly 30000 atomic units for the advertised scan price, or enforce a lower user-configured maximum. Parse it strictly as a decimal integer and reject negative, malformed, or oversized values.
  5. Validate networkInfo.payTo against a recipient obtained through a trusted, independently authenticated configuration. If recipients are dynamic, display the recipient and amount and require explicit user approval.
  6. Allowlist the expected EIP-712 domain name and version.
  7. Retain a short authorization lifetime and use a cryptographically random nonce, such as crypto.randomBytes(32), rather than combining the current time with Math.random().
  8. Use the documented payment-identifier extension so retries cannot unintentionally create multiple charges.
  9. Keep the dedicated payment wallet recommendation and enforce a low balance or wallet-level spending limit.
  10. Update the “read-only” wording to clarify that scanning does not modify the analyzed token, but the Skill signs a payment authorization that can transfer funds from the payment wallet.
  11. Apply the same validation helper to the viem, ethers.js, @x402/fetch, and managed-wallet integrations wherever the integration permits pre-signing policy checks.

Example hardening logic:

javascript
const EXPECTED_NETWORK = 'eip155:8453';
const EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID = 8453;
const EXPECTED_ASSET = '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913';
const EXPECTED_AMOUNT = 30000n;

const networkInfo = paymentRequired.accepts.find(
  item => item.network === EX
...[truncated 863 chars]
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (12)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

md
const wallet = createWallet(process.env.X402_PAYMENT_KEY);

const response = await x402Fetch('https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/scan/full', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
  body: JSON.stringify({

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 327)May include surrounding context.

md
const wallet = createWallet(process.env.X402_PAYMENT_KEY);

const response = await x402Fetch('https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/scan/full', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
  body: JSON.stringify({

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 338)May include surrounding context.

Pattern 5: AgentWallet (frames.ag)

javascript
const response = await fetch('https://frames.ag/api/wallets/{username}/actions/x402/fetch', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Authorization': `Bearer ${AGENTWALLET_API_TOKEN}`,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 356)May include surrounding context.

Pattern 6: Sponge Wallet (One-Liner)

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.wallet.paysponge.com/api/x402/fetch" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SPONGE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 356)May include surrounding context.

Pattern 6: Sponge Wallet (One-Liner)

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.wallet.paysponge.com/api/x402/fetch" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SPONGE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Reference.md (reported line 380)May include surrounding context.

md
recipient: recipientFromHeader
});

const response = await fetch('https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/scan/full', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes very broad everyday phrases like 'is this token safe', 'scam check', and 'safe to buy', which can match normal conversation and cause the skill to activate unintentionally. In a skill that initiates paid external API calls, accidental invocation can lead to unwanted spend and unnecessary transmission of token-related queries to third parties.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The curl example posts scan details plus a bearer credential to an external wallet/payment processor. This is a real data egress and credential-use path; if operators copy the example into insecure environments, tokens may be exposed via shell history, process inspection, CI logs, or misconfigured telemetry.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

Pattern A: Sponge Wallet (Recommended — No Raw Keys)

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.wallet.paysponge.com/api/x402/fetch" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SPONGE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The curl example posts scan details plus a bearer credential to an external wallet/payment processor. This is a real data egress and credential-use path; if operators copy the example into insecure environments, tokens may be exposed via shell history, process inspection, CI logs, or misconfigured telemetry.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

Pattern A: Sponge Wallet (Recommended — No Raw Keys)

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.wallet.paysponge.com/api/x402/fetch" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SPONGE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This code sends data and an authorization bearer token to an external wallet service endpoint. Even though the API token is not hardcoded, the skill normalizes exfiltration of wallet-linked credentials and scan parameters to a third party, which expands trust boundaries and could expose financial metadata or enable abuse if the token is mishandled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

Pattern B: AgentWallet (No Raw Keys)

javascript
const response = await fetch('https://frames.ag/api/wallets/{username}/actions/x402/fetch', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Authorization': `Bearer ${process.env.AGENTWALLET_API_TOKEN}`,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This pattern uses a raw private key from environment variables for programmatic signing and then transmits a paid request to an external service. While the key is not directly sent, encouraging private-key-based automation materially increases the risk of key misuse, accidental exposure through logs/crashes, or compromise of a hot wallet tied to automated payments.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md
// NEVER use your main wallet or trading wallet private key here
const wallet = createWallet(process.env.X402_PAYMENT_KEY);

const response = await x402Fetch('https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/scan/full', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
  body: JSON.stringify({ chain: 'base', tokenAddress: '0x...' }),

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 323)May include surrounding context.

Quick Intel NEVER receives your private key. Quick Intel NEVER interacts with your tokens. Quick Intel is READ-ONLY — no transactions, no approvals.

text

**NEVER paste private keys, seed phrases, or wallet credentials into any prompt.** Quick Intel only needs the token's contract address and chain.