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Security audit

Moyu

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed maintenance helper, but it asks the agent to repeatedly collect sensitive memory, user, log, and capability information without clear limits or approval controls.

Review this skill before installing if your OpenClaw workspace contains private user notes, memories, logs, or sensitive task history. Only enable scheduled runs if you are comfortable with recurring summaries of that information, and prefer adding explicit confirmation, file allowlists, and redaction rules first.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding
Excessive Collection and Aggregation of Sensitive Agent State## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 16-29 **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive access to sensitive workspace data **Risk Level**: Medium ### Evidence ```markdown ## 📋 准备工作 - 确认当前工作区路径(可通过环境变量 `WORKSPACE` 或默认 `~/.openclaw/workspace` 获取)。 - 确保你有读写工作区内文件的权限。 ## 🔍 步骤1:检查自身状态 **目标**:查明当前智能体的状态、工作进度和可用技能。 1. **读取核心文件**: - 使用 `read` 工具读取 `IDENTITY.md`、`SOUL.md`、`USER.md`,了解基本设定。 - 读取 `MEMORY.md` 和今天的日志文件(`memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md`),了解近期活动和长期记忆。 2. **检查技能可用性**: - 调用 `list_skills` 工具获取当前已安装的技能列表(名称+描述)。 - 对比 `TOOLS.md` 中定义的技能,确保没有缺失。 3. **生成状态摘要**: ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the agent to locate its workspace and systematically read identity configuration, user information, long-term memory, daily activity logs, tool configuration, and installed Skill metadata. It then directs the agent to aggregate this information into a status report. This access pattern exceeds the minimum information generally required for a routine health check. In particular, `USER.md`, `MEMORY.md`, and daily logs may contain private user context, operational history, or other sensitive data. Tool and Skill enumeration also reveals the agent's available capabilities. The instructions do not define data minimization, field-level access restrictions, redaction, output access controls, or explicit user approval before sensitive files are processed. The Skill does not itself acquire new operating-system privileges, bypass a technical access-control mechanism, or transmit the collected information externally. The risk instead arises from directing an already privileged agent to use its existing file-read capabilities more broadly than necessary. ### Attack Path 1. A user, automation rule, or suggested daily trigger invokes the Skill. 2. The Skill resolves the workspace through `WORKSPACE` or the default `~/.openclaw/workspace` path. 3. The agent reads `IDENTITY.md`, `SOUL.md`, `USER.md`, `M ...[truncated 1063 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Apply least privilege by limiting routine status checks to non-sensitive health indicators and explicitly approved files. 2. Require affirmative user authorization before reading `USER.md`, `MEMORY.md`, or daily activity logs. 3. Read only the fields needed for the report instead of loading entire files. 4. Redact personal information, secrets, credentials, unique identifiers, private conversations, and detailed memory content before generating output. 5. Report counts or high-level status values rather than reproducing raw tasks, memories, or logs. 6. Avoid enumerating tools and installed Skills unless capability inventory is explicitly requested. 7. Add output-handling requirements that prevent sensitive reports from being written to shared locations or retained unnecessarily. 8. If scheduled execution is enabled, require explicit opt-in and provide a clear way to disable it. 9. Define an allowlist of workspace paths and prohibit traversal, symbolic-link following, or reads outside the approved workspace.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill’s description, trigger phrases, and operating instructions are entirely in Chinese, implying a fixed language/locale expectation without offering the user a choice or documenting a justified regional constraint. This can violate language/locale policy when users are not given an opt-in or alternative language path.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The trigger keywords are broad and semantically generic for maintenance or self-improvement, which increases the chance of unintended invocation during normal conversation. Because the skill performs workspace reads and can use powerful tools like read/write/exec, accidental activation could expose sensitive context or cause unintended autonomous actions.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.