Ae1
High
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md - Keep skill developer-focused (`SKILL.md` + API references only).
Security audit
ScrapeSense.com Developer
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill is a coherent ScrapeSense API helper, but it covers destructive, bulk-email, API-key, and webhook operations with limited safety guidance.
Review this skill before installing if you plan to let an agent act on your ScrapeSense account. Use least-privilege API keys, require explicit confirmation for delete, billing, webhook, key-management, and bulk-send actions, and avoid exposing raw keys or webhook secrets in prompts or logs.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md ## Scans - `GET, POST /scans` - `GET, DELETE /scans/{id}` - `GET /scans/{id}/tiles` - `POST /scans/{id}/pause` - `POST /scans/{id}/resume`
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md - `GET, POST /campaigns` - `POST /campaigns/create` - `GET /campaigns/stats/summary` - `GET, DELETE /campaigns/{id}` - `GET /campaigns/{id}/emails` - `GET, PUT, DELETE /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}/approve`
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md - `GET /campaigns/stats/summary` - `GET, DELETE /campaigns/{id}` - `GET /campaigns/{id}/emails` - `GET, PUT, DELETE /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}/approve` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}/send` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/start`
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md - `POST /campaigns/{id}/emails/{emailId}/regenerate` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/regenerate-all` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/retry-failed` - `DELETE /campaigns/{id}/places/{placeId}` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/test-prompt` - `POST /campaigns/{id}/preview`
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Developer key management endpoints are materially more sensitive than ordinary CRUD operations because deleting or modifying keys can revoke access, disrupt integrations, or facilitate unsafe key lifecycle handling if an agent uses them casually. In a developer-focused skill, listing these endpoints without prominent cautions around least privilege, secure storage, rotation procedures, and confirmation increases the chance of credential-management mistakes with high operational impact.
- Content
md ## Developer API Keys - `GET, POST /developer/keys` - `PATCH, DELETE /developer/keys/{id}` - `GET /developer/keys/{id}/usage` ## Developer Webhooks
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Webhook management endpoints can alter outbound notification destinations and delivery behavior, which creates security and integrity risks if used without careful review. In a developer automation context, undocumented safeguards around patch/delete operations may lead to accidental disruption, unauthorized exfiltration via attacker-controlled webhook URLs, or weakened event-monitoring integrity.
- Content
md ## Developer Webhooks - `GET /developer/webhooks/events` - `GET, POST /developer/webhooks` - `PATCH, DELETE /developer/webhooks/{id}` - `POST /developer/webhooks/{id}/test` - `GET /developer/webhooks/{id}/deliveries` - `POST /developer/webhooks/deliveries/{deliveryId}/retry`
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
The capability reference explicitly advertises bulk outbound actions such as approve-all and send-all-approved without any adjacent warning, confirmation requirement, rate-limiting guidance, recipient safeguards, or human-review constraints. In a developer skill, this can normalize high-impact mass email behavior and lead downstream agents or implementers to trigger large outbound sends accidentally, causing spam, compliance, reputational, or operational harm.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 90% confidence
- Finding
This endpoint map documents numerous destructive and state-changing operations such as delete, cancel, send, approve-all, and key/webhook management without any warning about confirmation requirements, authorization sensitivity, or irreversible effects. In a developer-facing skill, that omission can encourage unsafe automation and accidental misuse of powerful API actions, especially when an agent may translate this reference directly into executable workflows.
- Content
Natural-Language Policy Violations
Low
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 97% confidence
- Finding
The guardrail says to keep user-facing updates concise and in English unless explicitly requested otherwise. This sets a default language constraint rather than offering a neutral user language choice, which matches the policy's language/locale violation criterion.
- Content