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Security audit

trendyol-admin

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Trendyol admin API reference is mostly purpose-aligned, but it embeds Postman access keys and gives risky credential-handling guidance for high-impact marketplace actions.

Review this skill before installing. Use it only with a Trendyol account where you are comfortable allowing API-assisted product, order, invoice, webhook, and finance operations. Do not paste real API secrets into shell one-liners or shared transcripts, and treat the embedded Postman access_key URLs as leaked credentials that should be removed or rotated by the publisher.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/api_reference.md:920
Finding

Hard-Coded Postman API Access Keys

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/api_reference.md, lines 920 and 925
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext hard-coded credentials
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable code at line 920:

text
https://api.postman.com/collections/36945960-f299f4ac-3cc4-4046-9265-3ca292b35deb?access_key=PMAT-01JP73Q6C4P7EJV2P4WF4MVN3E

Vulnerable code at line 925:

text
https://api.postman.com/collections/36945960-f8cac0c6-61f5-4cae-acdd-8c8bf5d2a7f2?access_key=PMAT-01JP73ZAWG57SVKBW7VKYCAYBS

Technical Analysis

Two credential-like Postman access keys are embedded in plaintext URL query parameters. Any party that can read the skill package, repository history, generated documentation, logs, or copied links can obtain these keys without authentication.

URL query parameters are especially prone to secondary disclosure because complete URLs may be retained in browser history, proxy logs, monitoring systems, command histories, and referrer data. The keys can be submitted directly to the referenced Postman API collection endpoints. Their precise permissions and current validity cannot be established from the audited files, so the finding does not demonstrate access beyond whatever privileges Postman assigned to them.

Attack Path

  1. Obtain a copy of the skill package or access its documentation or repository history.
  2. Read lines 920 and 925 of references/api_reference.md.
  3. Extract either value beginning with PMAT- from the access_key query parameter.
  4. Send a request to the corresponding api.postman.com/collections/... URL with the exposed key.
  5. Retrieve any collection data authorized by that key.
  6. Retain or redistribute the key until it is revoked or expires.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation may disclose the referenced Postman collections and any request definitions, endpoint details, examples, or configuration stored in them. If the keys grant broader permissio ...[truncated 447 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Revoke both exposed Postman access keys immediately and verify their activity logs for unauthorized use.
  2. Generate replacement credentials only if operationally required, applying the narrowest available permissions and expiration period.
  3. Remove credential-bearing URLs from the current files and all accessible repository history, releases, archives, and generated documentation.
  4. Replace the links with credential-free public collection URLs. If authentication is necessary, require users to supply their own token through a protected environment variable or secret manager.
  5. Avoid credentials in URL query parameters. Pass secrets through supported authorization headers or secure client configuration.
  6. Enable automated secret scanning in pre-commit hooks and CI, including detection for PMAT- tokens and access_key parameters.
  7. Review logs, tickets, chat messages, and mirrors where these complete URLs may have been copied, and remove or redact them where possible.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs agents to generate a Basic Auth header using a shell one-liner that places the API key and secret directly on the command line. Command-line secrets can be exposed through shell history, process listings, logs, or agent telemetry, increasing the chance of credential disclosure. In this skill's context, the exposed credentials grant administrative access to a marketplace API, making misuse capable of affecting products, inventory, and orders.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes the skill as covering product lifecycle, stock/price management, order processing, returns, and customer questions. This reference also includes full Webhook Integration and Accounting/Finance Integration sections, which are additional capabilities not mentioned in the manifest description and materially broaden what API requests the skill can help construct.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The document exposes live Postman collection URLs containing access_key query parameters, which are bearer-style tokens that may grant access to private or mutable resources. Publishing such tokens in a skill reference encourages downstream users or agents to transmit them to third parties and may leak access outside the intended boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This specific external URL sends users to api.postman.com with an embedded access key, creating an unnecessary third-party transmission path for sensitive collection access. In the context of an admin marketplace skill, including operational links with live tokens increases the chance an agent or user will exfiltrate or misuse credentials during setup or automation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 920)May include surrounding context.

Trendyol API Collection:

text
https://api.postman.com/collections/36945960-f299f4ac-3cc4-4046-9265-3ca292b35deb?access_key=PMAT-01JP73Q6C4P7EJV2P4WF4MVN3E

Trendyol Webhook Collection:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This is another live third-party Postman URL with an embedded access key, which can expose collection access to unauthorized parties and normalize secret-bearing URLs inside the skill. Because this skill is intended for admin/API construction, users may trust and reuse the link operationally, magnifying token leakage risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api_reference.md (reported line 925)May include surrounding context.

Trendyol Webhook Collection:

text
https://api.postman.com/collections/36945960-f8cac0c6-61f5-4cae-acdd-8c8bf5d2a7f2?access_key=PMAT-01JP73ZAWG57SVKBW7VKYCAYBS

Import via: Postman > Import > Link

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.