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Security audit

AppDeploy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This deployment skill does what it advertises, but it needs review because it can create and store an AppDeploy API key and upload project files without strong built-in safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable sending deployment files to AppDeploy. Before use, create or review the API key deliberately, protect the .appdeploy file, exclude secrets and local-only files from any upload, and inspect the upload manifest before deployment.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:126
Finding

Project Upload Workflow Lacks Mandatory Sensitive-File Exclusions

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:38
Finding

Bearer API Key Is Stored in a Plaintext Project File Without Permission Hardening

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest says to use the skill whenever the user asks to 'deploy or publish a website or web app and wants a public URL,' which is a broad natural-language trigger without clear exclusions or boundary conditions. The file does not provide negative examples or narrower activation constraints, increasing the risk of unintended invocation for general web-development requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to obtain an API key by making an outbound request to a third-party service and then store that credential locally for future authenticated calls. This creates an external trust boundary crossing and can cause unauthorized account creation, credential provisioning, and subsequent transmission of user project contents to a remote service without strong user confirmation and scoped consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

  1. If no API key exists, register and get one:
    bash
    curl -X POST https://api-v2.appdeploy.ai/mcp/api-key \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name": "claude-code"}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.