T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:65- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Automatically Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 65–83
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: Mediumjson { "mcpServers": { "ai-seo": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@automatelab/ai-seo-mcp"] } } }json { "mcpServers": { "ai-seo": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@automatelab/ai-seo-mcp"] } } }Technical Analysis
Both documented MCP configurations invoke
npxwith the-yoption and an npm package name that has no exact version or integrity hash. Consequently, npm may download and execute whichever package release is resolved at invocation time. The effective executable can therefore change after the Skill has been reviewed.The
-yoption suppresses the normal installation confirmation, reducing the opportunity for users to inspect the resolved version before execution. If the npm publisher account, package, release process, or another relevant supply-chain component is compromised, a malicious package release could execute arbitrary JavaScript under the account running the MCP host.No evidence establishes that the currently referenced package is malicious. This finding concerns the unsafe, mutable dependency-execution mechanism documented by the Skill.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release pipeline, or another component capable of controlling a newly resolved release of
@automatelab/ai-seo-mcp. - The attacker publishes a malicious release containing an installation hook, altered server entry point, or other executable payload.
- A user follows the Skill documentation and configures the MCP host with
npx -y @automatelab/ai-seo-mcp. - The MCP host invokes the command, and
npxretrieves the currently resolved package without requiring interactive approval. - The malicious package executes with the operating-system privileges and environment of the user running the MC ...[truncated 800 chars]
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release pipeline, or another component capable of controlling a newly resolved release of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the floating package reference with an audited exact version, for example:
json { "command": "npx", "args": ["--yes", "@automatelab/ai-seo-mcp@0.5.0"] } - Prefer installing the package through a committed lockfile and running the locally installed, reviewed executable instead of resolving a package dynamically on every launch.
- Verify npm integrity metadata and package provenance during installation. Where feasible, record and independently validate the expected package checksum.
- Remove unattended
-yor--yesbehavior where interactive verification is practical, and instruct users to confirm the resolved package name, publisher, and exact version. - Run the MCP server with least privilege in a sandbox or container. Restrict filesystem access, environment-variable exposure, credentials, and outbound network access to what the SEO auditing functionality requires.
- Establish a controlled update process in which new dependency versions are reviewed and tested before the pinned version is changed.
- Replace the floating package reference with an audited exact version, for example:
