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Security audit

TikTok-达人带货选品建联专家 | 青虎AI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed TikTok influencer-research workflow that uses a Qinghu API token and external data calls with user confirmation, with no hidden execution or persistence found.

Install only if you intend to use Qinghu's TikTok influencer data service. Be aware that the skill can use a Qinghu API key from your environment or one you provide, will make authenticated external API calls after confirmation, and may export larger result sets to a local table file.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The metadata says the skill 'must trigger' for a wide class of TikTok influencer-research requests, creating an overbroad activation surface. Over-triggering can cause the agent to route ordinary conversations into this skill unexpectedly, increasing chances of unnecessary external calls, token use, and unintended data processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The example trigger phrases are broad natural-language requests without negative examples or disambiguation rules. This makes accidental activation more likely in benign planning or advisory conversations, which can lead to unnecessary API usage and exposure of external-integration capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to obtain secrets from environment variables (QINGHU_TOKEN / QHKIT_TOKEN) even though the user-facing purpose is influencer discovery, not secret management. In an agentic environment, this expands access to credentials beyond explicit user consent and can enable unintended use of ambient secrets for external API calls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.