Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill’s core TikTok product lookup purpose is coherent, but it tells the agent to install and configure local software dynamically, which deserves user review before use.
Install only if you are comfortable with qhkit, npm/Node installation, local token configuration, and paid Qinghu API calls. Prefer a preinstalled or platform-managed qhkit version, avoid unpinned npx/@latest execution on sensitive hosts, and approve any paid calls or local environment changes explicitly.
The manifest description defines activation using only Chinese trigger phrases and frames the skill behavior entirely in Chinese, which can impose a specific language expectation on users. The file does not offer any alternative language option or state that Chinese is optional, so it may violate language/locale neutrality policy.
The skill goes far beyond its stated query purpose by instructing the agent to install software, configure tokens, modify PATH, and alter local runtime state. This expands the attack surface significantly: a data lookup skill should not be self-authorizing environment bootstrap logic, especially when the content is treated as potentially adversarial and may run on sensitive hosts.
The skill instructs use of npx @iqinghu/qhkit without pinning a specific version, which creates a supply-chain risk: a later compromised or breaking package release could be fetched and executed at runtime. Because this skill also encourages automatic environment bootstrapping, the unpinned execution path increases exposure beyond a purely informational document.
This duplicate finding identifies the same persistence behavior: installing Node under the user's home directory and exporting a modified PATH. In the context of an agent skill, that is dangerous because it normalizes host mutation and can outlive the session, contrary to least-privilege expectations for a read/query workflow.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
This duplicate finding identifies the same persistence behavior: installing Node under the user's home directory and exporting a modified PATH. In the context of an agent skill, that is dangerous because it normalizes host mutation and can outlive the session, contrary to least-privilege expectations for a read/query workflow.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
No suspicious patterns detected.