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Security audit

视频号-账号认证信息 | 青虎AI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a legitimate narrow purpose, but it asks the agent to install and update software, alter the local environment, and configure third-party API credentials in ways that deserve review before use.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill use the Qinghu qhkit CLI, make paid API calls after consent, and store or use a Qinghu API token. Prefer preinstalling a vetted qhkit version yourself and providing credentials through a controlled secret mechanism instead of allowing automatic global installs, unpinned npx execution, PATH changes, or shell startup modifications.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The keyword list is broad and overlaps with ordinary discussion of WeChat Channels and account topics, increasing the chance of accidental activation. In this skill, accidental activation is more dangerous because the skill also contains instructions for paid calls, software installation, and credential configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The keyword list is broad and overlaps with ordinary discussion of WeChat Channels and account topics, increasing the chance of accidental activation. In this skill, accidental activation is more dangerous because the skill also contains instructions for paid calls, software installation, and credential configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill goes far beyond a narrow account-info lookup by directing the agent to bootstrap Node, install packages, modify PATH, and perform environment setup on the host. This materially expands the attack surface from a simple data lookup into host-level software installation and execution, which is dangerous if the skill content is adversarial or triggered unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to run an unpinned package via npx (npx @iqinghu/qhkit), which allows whatever version is current at execution time to be fetched and executed. In an agent context, this creates supply-chain risk and undermines reproducibility, especially because the package is then used to access external services and process user-driven inputs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This duplicate finding points to the same persistence behavior: installation into a user-controlled directory and PATH modification for future command resolution. Even though the text mentions checksum verification, the core issue remains that the skill is instructing persistent host alteration unrelated to a minimal account-info lookup.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

Linux 二进制安装(装到用户目录,无需 root;先校验官方 SHA256 再解包):

cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"

text

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This duplicate finding points to the same persistence behavior: installation into a user-controlled directory and PATH modification for future command resolution. Even though the text mentions checksum verification, the core issue remains that the skill is instructing persistent host alteration unrelated to a minimal account-info lookup.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

Linux 二进制安装(装到用户目录,无需 root;先校验官方 SHA256 再解包):

cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"

text

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to configure API secrets in the host environment via qhkit config set --token or QHKIT_TOKEN. Asking an agent to set persistent credentials for a third-party service exceeds the stated skill purpose and risks secret exposure, misuse, and unintended cross-session persistence.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.