Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill does the advertised Ozon keyword-trend lookup, but it also tells the agent to install and configure external software on the host automatically if dependencies are missing.
Install only if you trust Qinghu qhkit and are comfortable with the agent installing Node/npm tooling, changing qhkit configuration, and using an API token. Prefer reviewing or running setup commands yourself, protect the token, and confirm paid Qinghu credit use before calls.
The manifest description says the skill must trigger when the user says specific phrases "或提出同类需求时必须触发", but it does not define what counts as a similar request. That creates a broad, ambiguous activation boundary and could cause unintended invocation for loosely related Ozon or keyword-analysis requests.
Although the skill is described as a keyword-trend lookup, it also contains extensive environment bootstrapping steps that install Node, install global npm packages, and fetch binaries from the network. This expands the skill from data retrieval into system modification, increasing attack surface and exposing users to package, binary, and configuration risks unrelated to the core task.
The skill includes shell commands for installing software and handling API tokens, but does not present an upfront warning that these actions modify the host, access external networks, and may expose secrets if entered in shared shells or logs. In a hostile or poorly controlled environment, this can lead to unintended system changes and credential leakage.
The skill instructs use of npx @iqinghu/qhkit without pinning a specific version, which makes execution depend on whatever package version is current at runtime. That creates a supply-chain risk: a future compromised or breaking release could be fetched and executed automatically in the user environment.
This duplicated finding points to the same persistence behavior: unpacking software into a user-controlled directory and instructing PATH changes that may outlive the session. Such persistence increases risk because later shells may implicitly trust and execute the installed binaries without the user revisiting the original decision.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
This duplicated finding points to the same persistence behavior: unpacking software into a user-controlled directory and instructing PATH changes that may outlive the session. Such persistence increases risk because later shells may implicitly trust and execute the installed binaries without the user revisiting the original decision.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
No suspicious patterns detected.