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Security audit

B站-社媒运营专家 | 青虎AI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Bilibili marketing-analysis skill that uses Qinghu's API and may export result files, with no evidence of hidden execution, persistence, or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the agent access to a Qinghu API token for Bilibili data lookups, possible Qinghu point charges, and automatic local export files for larger result sets. Use a scoped token where possible and review exported files before sharing them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The metadata description says B站运营、拆解脚本、找UP主投放、看评论舆情、做种草时“必须触发”, which creates an overly broad routing rule for a large class of common requests. This can cause the skill to activate when the user did not intend third-party data access or paid tool usage, increasing the chance of unnecessary external calls, over-collection, and user confusion about what capabilities are being invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The skill title and instructions are entirely Chinese and are framed as a fixed interaction mode for this skill, but there is no statement offering language selection or explaining that the skill is intentionally Chinese-only for a documented regional requirement. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to obtain API credentials from the user or environment variables and use them in outbound HTTP requests. In an adversarial or overly broad activation context, this increases the risk of secret handling mistakes, unintended transmission of user-provided tokens to external services, and confusion between user consent for analysis versus consent to use credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs automatic export of table files whenever records are ≥10 and explicitly says not to ask the user first. Auto-generating files can write potentially sensitive or copyrighted third-party data to local storage or external artifacts without clear consent, and may surprise users by creating persistent outputs they did not request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.