Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill matches its Amazon seller-origin analysis purpose, but it also directs automatic local installation and execution of third-party tooling in ways users should review first.
Install only if you trust the qhkit package and are comfortable with it being installed or configured locally. Prefer using a preinstalled or platform-managed qhkit, avoid unpinned npx or @latest upgrades in sensitive environments, and approve paid qhkit calls only after checking the estimated credits and requested marketplace/category parameters.
The description says the skill must trigger when the user says the listed examples "or提出同类需求时必须触发", which broadens activation beyond the explicit phrases. This leaves the boundary of what counts as a similar request unclear and could cause unintended invocation on adjacent Amazon-analysis queries.
The skill goes far beyond seller-origin analytics and includes extensive instructions to install Node, install npm packages, configure credentials, and modify the runtime environment. This meaningfully expands the attack surface by turning a data-query skill into a general environment bootstrapper capable of introducing new code and secrets-handling behaviors unrelated to the user’s analytic request.
The skill instructs the agent to execute an unpinned package via npx @iqinghu/qhkit, which fetches whatever version is current at runtime. That creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised latest release or dependency could execute arbitrary code in the agent environment, and the risk is amplified because this is presented as part of automatic environment bootstrap.
This duplicated finding reflects the same persistence behavior: installing binaries into a user-controlled home directory and altering execution paths for future commands. Such stateful modification is unnecessary for the declared business function and creates lasting exposure if the installed toolchain is compromised or misused later.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
This duplicated finding reflects the same persistence behavior: installing binaries into a user-controlled home directory and altering execution paths for future commands. Such stateful modification is unnecessary for the declared business function and creates lasting exposure if the installed toolchain is compromised or misused later.
cd /tmp && curl -fsSLO https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz cd /tmp && curl -fsSL https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt | grep ' node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz$' | sha256sum -c - mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/lib" && tar -xJf /tmp/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64.tar.xz -C "$HOME/.local/lib" export PATH="$HOME/.local/lib/node-v22.22.3-linux-x64/bin:$PATH"
No suspicious patterns detected.