Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill coherently manages knownAs.dev names and routes for OpenClaw, with sensitive actions disclosed and generally gated by user confirmation.
Install only if you intend this agent to manage a public knownAs.dev name for your OpenClaw gateway. Use a narrow, expiring KNOWNAS_API_KEY with the documented scopes, review prompts before approving public route or webhook changes, and avoid setting KNOWNAS_API_URL or KNOWNAS_SECRET_STORE_CMD unless you trust the destination and command.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
cmd_remove_route() {
[ $# -eq 2 ] || die "usage: remove-route ID SERVICE" 2
is_service "$2" || die "unknown service: $2" 2
status=$(call DELETE "/v1/identities/$1/routes/$2"); ok_or_die "$status"
jq '{service, status}' "$TMP/body"
}
The skill clearly instructs the agent to use shell commands and network access (sh, curl, openclaw, remote API calls), but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch creates a least-privilege failure: a runtime may permit broader capabilities than reviewers or users expect, making it easier for the skill to invoke sensitive operations without transparent authorization boundaries.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
printf 'header = "Idempotency-Key: %s"\n' "$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY"
fi
} | if [ -n "$body" ]; then
curl -sS --config - -X "$method" -o "$TMP/body" -w '%{http_code}' --data-binary "@$body" "$API$path"
else
curl -sS --config - -X "$method" -o "$TMP/body" -w '%{http_code}' "$API$path"
fi
No suspicious patterns detected.