T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
references/setup.md:49- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Auth0 Vue
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill is a coherent Auth0 Vue integration guide, but it includes copy-paste setup and token-handling examples that create meaningful security risk if followed as written.
Review before installing or using this skill. Prefer package-manager or pinned, verified Auth0 CLI installation steps; do not run the downloaded Linux installer automatically. When copying API examples, only attach access tokens to fixed trusted HTTPS API origins, avoid dumping full user objects in UI/logs, and keep SDK token storage in memory unless persistent sessions are an explicit, understood requirement.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)
T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
references/integration.md:221- Finding
Bearer Token Can Be Sent to an Arbitrary Caller-Controlled URL
- Content
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{ const token = await getAccessTokenSilently(); return fetch(url, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } }); }; ``` ### Technical Analysis The helper accepts an unrestricted URL and unconditionally attaches an Auth0 bearer token to the request. It does not verify the destination scheme, hostname, port, path, or relationship between the token audience and the destination API. Bearer tokens grant access to anyone possessing them. If an attacker can influence the `url` argument through application state, remote content, query parameters, configuration, or another injection flaw, the browser will transmit the token to the attacker's endpoint. The fixed-placeholder API examples elsewhere in the documentation represent a legitimate and necessary use of access tokens. The vulnerability is specific to this generic helper because it removes the destination trust boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An application adopts the documented `callProtectedApi(url)` helper. 2. Untrusted input is allowed to influence the `url` argument, directly or indirectly. 3. An attacker supplies a destination such as `https://attacker.example/collect`. 4. The helper obtains a valid access token through `getAccessTokenSilently()`. 5. `fetch()` sends `Authorization: Bearer <token>` to the attacker-controlled server. 6. The attacker captures the token and attempts to replay it against the API for which it was issued. 7. Replay succeeds to the extent permitted by the token's audience, scopes, lifetime, and server-side validation. ### Impact Assessment The immediate impact is disclosure of an Auth0 access token. An attacker may impersonate the authenticated user to the protected API and perform operations autho ...[truncated 394 chars]- Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
references/integration.md:284- Finding
Refresh Tokens Are Persisted in JavaScript-Accessible Local Storage
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
- MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (19)
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md - `user` - Reactive user profile information - `loginWithRedirect()` - Initiate login - `logout()` - Log out user - `getAccessTokenSilently()` - Get access token for API calls **Common Use Cases:** - Login/Logout buttons → See Step 4 above
Hidden Instructions
High
- Category
- Prompt Injection
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
- ```
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
Calling APIs
API Call with Access Token
vue <script setup lang="ts">
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md 4. **API Calls** - Call protected API endpoint - Verify access token is included - Verify API responds correctly ---
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md **Before running any part of this setup that writes to `.env`, you MUST ask the user for explicit confirmation.** Follow the steps below precisely. ### Step 1: Check for existing .env and confirm with user Before writing to `.env`, check whether the file already exists:
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md - If `.env` does **not** exist, ask: - Question: "This setup will create a `.env` file containing Auth0 credentials (domain and client ID). Do you want to proceed?" - Options: "Yes, create .env" / "No, I'll configure it manually" - If `.env` **already exists**, ask: - Question: "A `.env` file already exists and may contain secrets unrelated to Auth0. This setup will append Auth0 credentials to it without modifying existing content. Do you want to proceed?"
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Content
md - If `.env` does **not** exist, ask: - Question: "This setup will create a `.env` file containing Auth0 credentials (domain and client ID). Do you want to proceed?" - Options: "Yes, create .env" / "No, I'll configure it manually" - If `.env` **already exists**, ask: - Question: "A `.env` file already exists and may contain secrets unrelated to Auth0. This setup will append Auth0 credentials to it without modifying existing content. Do you want to proceed?"
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/auth0/auth0-cli/main/install.sh -o /tmp/auth0-install.sh echo "⚠️ Review the install script at /tmp/auth0-install.sh before running" sh /tmp/auth0-install.sh -b /usr/local/bin rm /tmp/auth0-install.sh fi fi
Tool Parameter Abuse
High
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/auth0/auth0-cli/main/install.sh -o /tmp/auth0-install.sh echo "⚠️ Review the install script at /tmp/auth0-install.sh before running" sh /tmp/auth0-install.sh -b /usr/local/bin rm /tmp/auth0-install.sh fi fi
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 95% confidence
- Finding
The example renders the full Auth0 user object with JSON.stringify, which can expose more profile attributes than intended in the browser UI, screenshots, logs, or shared sessions. In an authentication integration guide, this is especially risky because developers may copy the snippet directly into production and inadvertently disclose sensitive identity data.
- Content
Intent-Code Divergence
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 97% confidence
- Finding
The guide explicitly tells the user to review the downloaded Linux install script before executing it, but the automated Bash path immediately runs that remote-fetched script anyway. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the script source is compromised or the transport/path is abused, arbitrary code will run locally with the user's privileges without the promised review step occurring.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Low
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
This markdown file includes an example that retrieves an access token and sends it in an Authorization header to
https://your-api.com/data. While the behavior is expected for an API-calling example, the surrounding description does not explicitly warn that user/session credentials will be transmitted to a backend service.- Content