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Security audit

Auth0 Springboot Api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Auth0 setup guide with expected project and Auth0 configuration steps, not hidden or deceptive behavior.

Before installing, be aware that automated setup can create an Auth0 API resource and write application.yml in your project after you choose that path. Review generated Spring security and error-handling code, avoid returning raw exception messages to clients, and do not paste real client secrets into examples unless you intend to request a token from your own Auth0 tenant.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/integration.md:271
Finding
Raw Exception Messages Exposed in HTTP Responses## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/integration.md`, lines 271–275 **Vulnerability Type**: Information disclosure through unsafe exception handling **Risk Level**: Medium ```java @ExceptionHandler(Exception.class) public ResponseEntity<Map<String, Object>> handleError(Exception e) { return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR) .body(Map.of("error", e.getMessage())); } ``` ### Technical Analysis The recommended global exception handler catches every `Exception` and returns the raw result of `e.getMessage()` to the requesting client. Exception messages are intended for diagnostics and may contain internal filesystem paths, database or query details, internal hostnames, object identifiers, validation internals, or implementation-specific information. Because the handler applies to the broad `Exception` base class, it may expose messages from controllers, service components, persistence layers, and third-party libraries. The information returned depends on the exception triggered, but the application has no output filtering or sanitization boundary in this example. ### Attack Path 1. An application implements the documented global exception handler. 2. A remote caller submits malformed input or invokes operations likely to produce application errors. 3. A controller or downstream component throws an exception containing internal diagnostic details. 4. The handler catches the exception and serializes its raw message into the HTTP response body. 5. The caller repeats this process across inputs and endpoints to collect implementation details that may assist subsequent attacks. ### Impact Assessment This issue does not directly grant system privileges or authorization bypass. Its immediate scope is disclosure of whatever diagnostic information appears in exception messages. Depending on the underlying failure, that information may reveal application structure, ...[truncated 409 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Return a fixed, generic client-facing error message rather than `e.getMessage()`. - Log full exception details only on the server through structured logging, with controls to prevent credentials, tokens, and personal data from entering logs. - Generate a correlation or incident identifier and return that identifier to the client so operators can locate the corresponding server-side event. - Replace the broad `Exception` handler where practical with handlers for expected exception classes, assigning appropriate status codes and explicitly controlled response fields. - Keep framework stack traces and detailed error messages disabled in production responses. - Add tests that trigger representative controller, validation, persistence, and dependency failures and verify that responses contain no internal diagnostic details. A safer pattern is: ```java @ExceptionHandler(Exception.class) public ResponseEntity<Map<String, Object>> handleError(Exception e) { String incidentId = UUID.randomUUID().toString(); logger.error("Unhandled exception; incidentId={}", incidentId, e); return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR) .body(Map.of( "error", "An internal error occurred", "incidentId", incidentId )); } ```
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (9)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
---
name: auth0-springboot-api
description: Use when securing Spring Boot API endpoints with JWT Bearer token validation, scope-based authorization, or DPoP proof-of-possession - integrates com.auth0:auth0-springboot-api SDK for REST APIs receiving access tokens from frontends or mobile apps. Triggers on Auth0AuthenticationFilter, Spring Boot API auth, JWT validation, SecurityFilterChain, hasAuthority SCOPE.
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  author: Auth0 <support@auth0.com>
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Auth0 Spring Boot API Integration

Protect Spring Boot API endpoints with JWT access token validation using `com.auth0:auth0-springboot-api`. Features auto-configuration, scope-based authorization, and built-in DPoP (RFC 9449) support.

---
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Auth0 Spring Boot API Integration

Protect Spring Boot API endpoints with JWT access token validation using `com.auth0:auth0-springboot-api`. Features auto-configuration, scope-based authorization, and built-in DPoP (RFC 9449) support.

---
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Auth0 Spring Boot API Integration

Protect Spring Boot API endpoints with JWT access token validation using `com.auth0:auth0-springboot-api`. Features auto-configuration, scope-based authorization, and built-in DPoP (RFC 9449) support.

---
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Auth0 Spring Boot API Integration

Protect Spring Boot API endpoints with JWT access token validation using `com.auth0:auth0-springboot-api`. Features auto-configuration, scope-based authorization, and built-in DPoP (RFC 9449) support.

---
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
- [Auth0 Java Spring Security API Quickstart](https://auth0.com/docs/quickstart/backend/java-spring-security5)
- [SDK GitHub Repository](https://github.com/auth0/auth0-auth-java)
- [Spring Security Documentation](https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/reference/)
- [Access Tokens Guide](https://auth0.com/docs/secure/tokens/access-tokens)
- [DPoP RFC 9449](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9449)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| Status | Cause | Fix |
|--------|-------|-----|
| 401 | Missing or invalid token | Include valid `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header |
| 401 | Expired token | Request a fresh access token |
| 401 | Wrong audience | Token's `aud` claim must match your API Identifier |
| 403 | Insufficient scope | Token must include required scopes |
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Request Tokens with Scopes

```bash
curl -X POST https://your-tenant.auth0.com/oauth/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "client_id": "YOUR_CLIENT_ID",
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
--audience https://my-springboot-api
```

### Via curl (Client Credentials Flow)

```bash
curl -X POST https://your-tenant.auth0.com/oauth/token \
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/api.md:262