T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
references/cli.md:18- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installation Script Can Execute Mutable External Code
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Auth0 quickstart skill is mostly coherent documentation, but it includes high-impact Auth0 tenant administration commands without enough guardrails.
Review before installing if you will connect it to a real Auth0 tenant. Prefer the Homebrew CLI install, avoid entering real passwords directly in command lines, and do not run delete or tenant-admin commands unless you have verified the tenant and resource IDs and understand the impact.
references/cli.md:18Unpinned Remote Installation Script Can Execute Mutable External Code
references/cli.md:155User Password Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/auth0/auth0-cli/main/install.sh -o /tmp/auth0-install.sh
sh /tmp/auth0-install.sh rm /tmp/auth0-install.sh
### Windows
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Token | Purpose | Lifespan | Where Stored |
|-------|---------|----------|--------------|
| **Access Token** | API authorization | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **ID Token** | User identity info (JWT) | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **Refresh Token** | Get new access tokens | Long (days/months) | Secure storage only |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Token | Purpose | Lifespan | Where Stored |
|-------|---------|----------|--------------|
| **Access Token** | API authorization | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **ID Token** | User identity info (JWT) | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **Refresh Token** | Get new access tokens | Long (days/months) | Secure storage only |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Token | Purpose | Lifespan | Where Stored |
|-------|---------|----------|--------------|
| **Access Token** | API authorization | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **ID Token** | User identity info (JWT) | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **Refresh Token** | Get new access tokens | Long (days/months) | Secure storage only |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
|-------|---------|----------|--------------|
| **Access Token** | API authorization | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **ID Token** | User identity info (JWT) | Short (hours) | Client or server |
| **Refresh Token** | Get new access tokens | Long (days/months) | Secure storage only |
### OAuth/OIDC Terms
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
**How it works:**
1. Service authenticates with client ID + secret
2. Receives access token
3. Uses token to call APIs
**Security:** No user involved, service-to-service only
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
**How it works:**
1. Service authenticates with client ID + secret
2. Receives access token
3. Uses token to call APIs
**Security:** No user involved, service-to-service only
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
**How it works:**
1. Service authenticates with client ID + secret
2. Receives access token
3. Uses token to call APIs
**Security:** No user involved, service-to-service only
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **Restart dev server** after changing `.env`
2. **Check variable prefix** (VITE_, REACT_APP_, etc.)
3. **Verify file name** (.env vs .env.local)
4. **Check file location** (must be in project root)
5. **Load dotenv** for Node.js: `require('dotenv').config()`
The manifest description says this skill detects those stacks, sets up an Auth0 account if needed, and routes to the correct SDK setup workflow. In the body, dedicated detection guidance and routing are provided for several frameworks, but FastAPI, ASP.NET Core, Android, and Swift appear only as Tier 2 docs links or related skills references rather than actual setup workflow coverage in this skill.
The documentation includes an application deletion command with no warning that the action is irreversible and can break authentication flows for dependent environments. In an agent skill context, terse destructive commands increase the chance that a user or agent invokes them casually during troubleshooting or cleanup.
The manifest describes a skill for adding authentication/login to an app, detecting the stack, and routing to the appropriate SDK setup workflow. This reference file documents unrelated administrative capabilities such as creating/deleting users, listing log streams, and creating/managing APIs, which are not obviously required for basic app authentication setup.
The user deletion command is documented without warning about permanent account removal and potential loss of auditability or access for real users. In a skill that may guide setup and debugging, presenting delete operations without guardrails raises the risk of accidental destructive administration.
The section is presented as a way to 'identify your framework,' yet the sample commands only grep package.json and list a handful of files such as angular.json, next.config, app.json, Package.swift, and build.gradle. This contradicts the broader detection claim for stacks like FastAPI and ASP.NET Core, which are not actually covered by the shown detection commands.
No suspicious patterns detected.