T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:421- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Control D skill is coherent for DNS management, but it needs review because it can make live account changes and includes high-risk endpoint deployment commands without strong safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill access to a Control D API token. Prefer a least-privilege or read-only token unless you truly need write operations, restrict the token by IP where possible, and require manual confirmation before deletes, organization updates, default-rule changes, provisioning changes, or mass deployment. Do not run the documented RMM installer one-liners across endpoints unless you independently verify the installer source, signature or checksum, and test it in a controlled environment first.
SKILL.md:421Unpinned Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed
scripts/controld.sh:105Unescaped CLI Arguments Are Interpolated into Privileged API JSON Payloads
The provisioning section includes remote deployment commands that download and execute scripts directly on endpoints, including PowerShell Invoke-Expression and shell piping from curl. This materially expands the skill from DNS management into remote code execution on managed devices, creating a severe compromise path if misused, substituted, or invoked without strong operator review.
The provisioning workflow presents downloaded-script execution on endpoints without an explicit warning that it runs remote code with elevated privileges. This normalizes a high-risk practice and could lead operators or agents to execute unreviewed code across many systems.
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The function deletes a profile based solely on a supplied identifier, with no validation of intent, confirmation, or guardrails. In an agent setting, untrusted prompt content or parameter manipulation could coerce deletion of critical DNS policy objects, causing loss of service controls or operational disruption.
profiles_delete() {
local id="$1"
api DELETE "/profiles/$id" | jq '.'
}
profiles_options() {
This endpoint removes devices by arbitrary supplied ID without safety checks. Abuse could disconnect endpoints from intended DNS policies or delete production device registrations, leading to outages or security policy bypass.
devices_delete() {
local id="$1"
api DELETE "/devices/$id" | jq '.'
}
# Filters
Folder deletion is performed directly from user-controlled parameters with no confirmation or validation. An incorrect or injected folder ID could remove groups of DNS rules, potentially weakening or disabling filtering policy at scale.
folders_delete() {
local profile_id="$1"
local folder_id="$2"
api DELETE "/profiles/$profile_id/groups/$folder_id" | jq '.'
}
# Custom rules
The script deletes custom DNS rules using a raw hostname path parameter, again without guardrails. If driven by an LLM agent, an attacker could influence parameters to remove allow/block rules, undermining protections or changing traffic handling for targeted domains.
rules_delete() {
local profile_id="$1"
local hostname="$2"
api DELETE "/profiles/$profile_id/rules/$hostname" | jq '.'
}
# Default rule