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Security audit

Aurex

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Aurex API guide for virtual card and payment operations, with sensitive financial capabilities clearly disclosed.

Before installing or using this skill, treat the Aurex API key and any returned card details as financial secrets. Prefer a pinned, reviewed SDK version or audited lockfile instead of installing the latest @aurexcash/agent package, and require explicit user confirmation before issuing cards, topping up balances, changing markup, or retrieving full card details.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:140
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 140-144
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency with npm lifecycle execution risk
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash
npm install @aurexcash/agent
typescript
import { createAurexTools } from '@aurexcash/agent'

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs users to install @aurexcash/agent without specifying an exact audited version, package integrity hash, or lockfile. Consequently, npm resolves whichever compatible release is current at installation time, along with mutable transitive dependencies.

npm packages may define lifecycle scripts that execute during installation. If the named package, its publishing account, or any transitive dependency is compromised, following this instruction could execute attacker-controlled code on the local system. The project contains no local copy of the dependency that could be audited to establish its behavior.

The package name itself is not proven malicious. The confirmed weakness is that the installation procedure relies on mutable, externally supplied code without reproducibility or integrity controls.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm package publisher, publishes a malicious release, or compromises a transitive dependency.
  2. A user follows the documented npm install @aurexcash/agent instruction.
  3. npm resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled version because no exact version or trusted integrity value is specified.
  4. Malicious lifecycle code executes during installation, or malicious package code executes when createAurexTools is imported or used.
  5. The code runs with the privileges of the installing process and can attempt to read accessible environment variables, files, and process data.
  6. If AUREX_API_KEY is present, the malicious code could steal it and use the associated Aurex API access.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code executio ...[truncated 565 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the package to a reviewed exact version rather than installing the mutable latest release:
    bash
    npm install --save-exact @aurexcash/agent@<reviewed-version>
    
  2. Generate, review, and commit a lockfile so package and transitive-dependency resolution is reproducible.
  3. Use npm ci in automated environments and verify lockfile integrity before installation.
  4. Publish and verify the package's official source repository, release provenance, and npm publisher identity.
  5. Audit the selected package version, transitive dependencies, and lifecycle scripts before recommending installation.
  6. Where compatible, install with lifecycle scripts disabled:
    bash
    npm install --ignore-scripts --save-exact @aurexcash/agent@<reviewed-version>
    
  7. Run dependency installation and SDK execution in a least-privileged, isolated environment.
  8. Avoid exposing AUREX_API_KEY during dependency installation. Provide it only to the runtime process that requires it, and restrict the key to the minimum supported permissions.
  9. Establish dependency-update review and vulnerability-monitoring procedures before changing the pinned version.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.