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Security audit

Zynd Agent Network

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it advertises, but it exposes network-facing agent messages, identity data, and payment authority with weak scoping and limited warnings.

Install only if you are comfortable running a network-facing agent integration. Use a low-privilege Zynd key and wallet with minimal funds, avoid sending private or regulated data to third-party agents, prefer HTTPS endpoints, bind webhook servers to localhost or protect them behind authentication, disable or protect /messages, and review the SDK version before setup.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/zynd_webhook_server.py:200
Finding

Unauthenticated Public Message Disclosure and Sender Spoofing

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/zynd_webhook_server.py:95
Finding

Untrusted Webhook Content Is Forwarded Into the Agent Processing Channel

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/zynd_call.py:100
Finding

Sensitive Task and Identity Data Can Be Sent to Arbitrary or Plaintext Destinations

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/zynd_register.py:111
Finding

Zynd API Key Can Be Redirected to a Caller-Controlled Registry

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/setup.sh:27
Finding

Unbounded Third-Party SDK Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk

Content
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=0.2.2" echo "" echo "Verifying installation..." python3 -c "import zyndai_agent; print(f'zyndai-agent installed successfully')" 2>/dev/null ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup script accepts every current or future release satisfying `zyndai-agent>=0.2.2` and requests an upgrade. It does not use an exact version, upper bound, lockfile, package hash, signed artifact, or isolated environment. Python packages may execute code during installation depending on their build configuration. The verification step also imports the installed package immediately, which executes its top-level initialization code. A compromised maintainer account, malicious future release, or compromised transitive dependency could therefore execute code with the permissions of the user running setup. Using the default pip package index does not by itself prove that the current package is malicious. The confirmed weakness is the absence of controls that bind installation to the version reviewed with the Skill. ### Attack Path 1. A malicious or compromised release of `zyndai-agent`, or one of its unconstrained transitive dependencies, is published. 2. The user or OpenClaw agent runs `scripts/setup.sh`. 3. Pip resolves the malicious version because it satisfies `>=0.2.2` and `--upgrade` favors a newer release. 4. Pip installs the package and may execute build-related package code. 5. The verification command imports the package and executes module initialization. 6. Malicious code runs with access to the invoking user's files, network access, environment variables, and any credentials available to the process. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency can potentially obtain ...[truncated 446 chars]
Remediation
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`. 2. Generate a lockfile covering all transitive dependencies. 3. Record and enforce package hashes with pip's `--require-hashes` option. 4. Review release artifacts and update pins only through a controlled dependency-review process. 5. Install into a dedicated virtual environment rather than the user's global Python environment. 6. Never run the installation as root or an administrator. 7. Prefer immutable, reproducibly built artifacts from a trusted source. 8. Audit package import-time behavior before using an import as installation verification. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (14)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The code does partially match the communication and payment portions of the description: it can send tasks to another agent via webhook, optionally use x402 micropayments, and receive/display responses. However, the declared purpose prominently includes discovering/searching for specialized agents across the Zynd network, and this code does not perform any search, discovery, or registry interaction. The --registry-url argument is defined but unused. The script’s actual purpose is narrower: direct calling of a known agent endpoint using a preconfigured local identity. This is a material scope difference, so the description does not accurately represent what this specific code chunk actually does.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The declared description describes a client capability for discovering, contacting, and paying other agents on the Zynd network. The supplied code does not implement those behaviors. Instead, it is a registration utility for publishing this agent to the network and keeping its webhook registration fresh. While registration may be related to participating in the network, the primary purpose is materially different from discovery-and-communication with other agents. The script also starts a long-running webhook refresh loop, but it does not search for agents, dispatch tasks, handle outbound micropayments, or retrieve responses as described.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The description presents a broad client/network capability: discovering agents by capability, communicating with them, sending tasks, paying them automatically, and receiving responses. This code chunk only implements an inbound webhook listener for receiving messages. It exposes /webhook and /webhook/sync endpoints, logs incoming messages, tracks them in memory, and provides /health and /messages endpoints. While this is related to agent communication within the Zynd ecosystem, it is only a narrow receiving component and lacks the key advertised behaviors of discovery, outbound task dispatch, and micropayment handling. Therefore the declared description materially overstates what this code chunk actually does.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The Create Agent response includes a base64-encoded seed but the documentation does not label it as secret key material or warn that exposure enables takeover of the agent identity and any wallet/payment functions derived from it. Because this skill supports agent registration, communication, and micropayments, mishandling the seed could let an attacker impersonate the agent or control associated funds.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The payment section states that the payment address is derived from the agent's seed but does not warn that seed compromise can compromise the payment identity and potentially any funds or payment authorization tied to that account. In this skill's context, where automatic x402 micropayments are a core feature, weak seed-handling guidance materially increases financial and impersonation risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly advertises that the skill can receive incoming webhook requests and make outbound paid agent calls, but it does not clearly warn users that enabling these features can expose prompts/data to third-party agents and can trigger real micropayment spending. In this skill’s context, that omission is materially risky because the core functionality is remote agent communication plus payment, so users may enable it without understanding privacy, trust-boundary, and cost consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
### 1. Get Your API Key

1. Visit [dashboard.zynd.ai](https://dashboard.zynd.ai)
2. Connect your wallet and create an account
3. Copy your **API Key**

### 2. Configure OpenClaw

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes Python scripts, requires an API key, and interacts with external network services, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This can cause an agent framework or user to underestimate the skill's ability to access secrets and make outbound requests, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure or unsafe execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The registration flow tells users to publish an agent name, description, capabilities, and public IP to a discovery network without prominently warning that this information becomes externally discoverable. Exposing infrastructure details and service metadata can increase attack surface, enable targeting, and leak operational information users may not expect to publish.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow explicitly encourages sending user tasks to external agents but does not require a clear warning or consent step before transmitting user content off-system. Because prompts may contain proprietary, personal, or regulated data, this creates a real risk of confidentiality loss to third-party agents outside the local trust boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The API reference shows webhook messages carrying DID credentials, sender/receiver identifiers, prompts, and message content, but does not warn that these fields may contain sensitive identity or task data. In a multi-agent network skill, this omission increases the chance developers will log, forward, or store this data insecurely, leading to privacy exposure or credential misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/zynd_call.py (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

python
processor.close()
        else:
            # Direct HTTP POST (no payment)
            response = requests.post(
                webhook_url,
                json=message.to_dict(),
                headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The webhook handler prints full incoming message contents, sender IDs, and message IDs to stdout, and the application also exposes stored messages via a GET endpoint, but the startup UX does not clearly warn operators that all inbound data will be logged and retrievable. In an agent environment, incoming messages may contain sensitive prompts, tokens, personal data, or business data, so this default disclosure behavior increases the chance of accidental leakage through logs, consoles, or shared process output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The /messages endpoint returns the last 20 received messages, including full message contents and sender/source metadata, with no authentication or authorization. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default, anyone who can reach the port can enumerate potentially sensitive inter-agent traffic, making this a real information disclosure issue in a network-facing component.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.