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Security audit

StripFeed

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently uses StripFeed's external API to turn web pages into Markdown, but users should avoid sending sensitive or private URLs through it.

Install only if you are comfortable having requested URLs and retrieved page content processed by StripFeed. Do not use it for internal systems, signed links, secret-bearing query strings, authenticated private documents, or regulated data unless you explicitly accept that disclosure; use cache=false when freshness or retention matters.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Third-Party Disclosure and Caching of Sensitive URLs and Retrieved Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages use on arbitrary URLs but does not clearly disclose that requested URLs and related metadata will be transmitted to stripfeed.dev, a third-party service. This can expose sensitive URLs, private query parameters, internal endpoints, or user research targets to an external provider without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance is broad enough to trigger for many ordinary tasks involving reading URLs or web pages, which can cause the agent to invoke this skill unnecessarily. That increases the chance that user-supplied URLs, internal links, or sensitive browsing targets are sent to a third-party service without clear user intent or data-minimization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The example performs external transmission of a user-provided URL to a third-party API, along with an authorization token and optional metadata such as model identifiers. In this skill's context, that means arbitrary browsing targets are relayed off-platform, which is risky if those targets contain secrets in the URL, refer to internal infrastructure, or reveal sensitive user activity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

When you need metadata alongside the content, use format=json:

bash
curl -s "https://www.stripfeed.dev/api/v1/fetch?url=URL_HERE&format=json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIPFEED_API_KEY"

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.