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Security audit

stack-mode

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent stacked-PR workflow helper, with disclosed PR-reading and root-summary commenting behavior but broad triggers users should be aware of.

Install this if you want stack-aware PR review or fix workflows. Before using it, verify that your GitHub CLI account has only the repository permissions you intend, and be aware that stack mode can post or update a consolidated comment on the root PR. The broad pr and review triggers may be noisier than ideal, so use explicit --stack workflows when possible.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

Using 'review' as a trigger can shadow or collide with a built-in review command, causing this skill to activate in contexts where a user intended a standard review workflow. In this skill's context, unintended activation matters because it changes behavior from single-PR handling to stack detection/iteration and can lead to unexpected PR comment posting across multiple PRs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Overly Broad Trigger

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Overly Broad Trigger: 'pr' is too short and may match unintended inputs

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest description frames the skill as detecting shared stack membership and iterating a command across PRs. However, the documented contract also requires writing a consolidated comment to the root PR via gh pr comment, which is a distinct side effect not reflected in that description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The note says the skill is a 'read/orchestration skill' and emphasizes that it does not push, rebase, or edit branches. Earlier instructions nevertheless require posting a summary comment on the root PR, so the documentation understates the skill's write effects and may mislead readers into expecting a read-only orchestration role.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.