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Security audit

mission-orchestrator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent project-orchestration tool, but it needs review because it can publish GitHub issues automatically and reduce approval prompts based on casual language.

Review this skill before installing if you use GitHub CLI authentication or work with private project details. Prefer disabling automatic issue creation, avoid --auto and casual autonomy phrases unless you intend fewer checkpoints, and inspect or periodically delete .attune state files that may contain project history or error details.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
modules/phase-routing.md:148
Finding

Artifact-Derived Content Can Cause Shell Command Injection

Content
View full analysis
: " \ --body "## Context Identified during phase. Artifact: ## Description " \ --label "feature,low-priority" ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented procedure extracts project names, summaries, artifact paths, and complete item text from project artifacts and interpolates those values into a Bash command. Shell double quotes do not neutralize command substitutions such as `$(command)` or backtick expressions. If the documented command is implemented by textual substitution and passed to a shell, an attacker-controlled Out of Scope item such as: ```text - Add reporting support $(malicious_command) ``` could cause `malicious_command` to execute locally before `gh` receives the final argument. The same risk applies to any interpolated field derived from an untrusted or generated artifact. The Markdown documentation does not require shell-free process invocation, robust escaping, validation, or use of a body file. This finding is conditional on an implementation executing the shown command through a shell after textual interpolation. The package contains documentation rather than an executable implementation, but following the protocol literally creates an exploitable command-injection channel. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker contributes or modifies `docs/project-brief.md` or `docs/specification.md`. 2. The attack ...[truncated 1299 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
modules/phase-routing.md:138
Finding

GitHub Issues Are Created Before Required User Confirmation

Content
View full analysis
: " \ --body "## Context Identified during phase. Artifact: ## Description " \ --label "feature,low-priority" ``` 6. Update the artifact's Out of Scope section with issue references: `- Item description (#NNN)` 7. Report created issues at the user checkpoint ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow performs the external action at step 5 and reports the resulting issues only at step 7. Consequently, the user checkpoint is retrospective rather than an authorization gate. This behavior conflicts with the skill's own stated safety requirements: - `modules/adaptive-constraints.md`, lines 94-105, states that external-facing actions such as issue comments cannot be overridden. - `modules/trust-tier.md`, lines 133-146, identifies external-facing actions as events that must always trigger a checkpoint regardless of trust tier. Generated or pre-existing artifacts can contain inaccurate, confidential, malicious, or otherwise inappropriate material. Automatically publishing their contents to GitHub without preview and explicit approval crosses ...[truncated 1531 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (20)

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Natural-language directive overrides allow phrases like 'don't keep asking' or 'be autonomous' to reduce checkpoints and alter constraint profiles without an explicit security control change. This is a classic prompt-surface vulnerability because ambiguous conversational wording can unintentionally or adversarially relax safeguards, reducing human oversight before risky actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow compounds risk by inferring trust from soft language cues and then using that inference to reduce oversight and stop asking for approvals. Even if a 'Safety Floor' remains, this creates a privilege-escalation-like path where ordinary phrasing changes governance behavior, making social engineering and accidental under-supervision significantly more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This module interprets trust and autonomy phrases as authorization to reduce oversight, effectively converting informal language into security-relevant control changes. That creates a dangerous prompt-to-policy path where a user, another skill, or injected content can weaken safeguards without using a deliberate security mechanism.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill treats broad, common natural-language phrases like "I trust you," "go ahead," and "just do it" as authority to reduce governance and auto-continue workflow checkpoints. This can be triggered unintentionally in ordinary conversation, causing the orchestrator to silently lower oversight for consequential actions and making prompt interpretation itself a security boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · modules/adaptive-constraints.md (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

md
3. **Hard vows from vow-enforcement** are always
   enforced. Soft vows may be relaxed by profile.
4. **Destructive operation confirmation** always
   prompts. No silent `rm -rf`, `git push --force`,
   or `DROP TABLE`.

Any code path bypassing the safety floor is a bug.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This section provides a concrete gh issue create workflow and instructs the skill to modify artifacts with returned issue references, turning a routing document into an actor that performs external writes and local file mutations. Because issue title/body content is derived from project artifacts, sensitive data could be propagated externally and the behavior could be triggered at scale in auto mode.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · modules/phase-routing.md (reported line 224)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Attempt recovery**:
   - TRANSIENT: Retry phase (max 2 attempts)
   - PERMANENT: Present error to user with options
   - CRASH: Clear context, retry with fresh state

3. **Update mission state**: Record error, recovery attempt, and outcome

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · modules/plan-versioner.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Optional cleanup (not automatic)
rm -rf .attune/plan-history/

The orchestrator does NOT auto-delete plan history.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Broad triggers like 'mission', 'orchestrator', 'lifecycle', and 'automation' are likely to collide with ordinary user language and cause accidental activation. For a skill that can persist state, route execution phases, and potentially cause downstream writes or issue creation, unintended invocation materially increases risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The documentation claims the orchestrator only delegates and never implements phase logic, but later sections show it parses natural-language trust signals and alters constraint behavior itself. This mismatch is dangerous because operators may rely on the simpler mental model while the skill is actually making security-relevant policy decisions internally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill description does not prominently disclose that it writes persistent state to .attune/mission-state.json and may create GitHub issues as part of backlog triage. Missing upfront disclosure prevents informed consent and makes accidental persistence or external side effects more likely during routine use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The orchestrator's documented role is lifecycle routing, but it also initiates post-phase backlog triage that can create GitHub issues, which is a side effect outside pure orchestration. That expands the skill from coordination into external state mutation, increasing the chance of unintended issue spam, data leakage into issue trackers, or unreviewed external actions triggered by normal project flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The design allows natural-language directives to suppress checkpoints and approvals, but only requires a one-time acknowledgement rather than a clear warning that oversight is being reduced. Users may not understand that benign conversational phrasing is being interpreted as consent to bypass review gates.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The text normalizes autonomy escalation through repeated successful runs and encourages reduced oversight as an operational convenience. In an orchestrator skill, that framing is risky because it can bias implementers toward building persistent trust mechanisms that erode human review over time.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This markdown file describes the skill as "Phase execution protocol, transition hooks, user checkpoints, and error handling via damage-control" without specifying concrete trigger phrases, scope boundaries, or exclusion conditions. That makes activation ambiguous for an orchestration-related request, increasing the chance of unintended invocation for general workflow discussions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The routing skill expands beyond orchestration by directing autonomous GitHub issue creation during phase transitions. Even though the intent appears workflow-oriented, this enables external side effects against a repository or organization without a clearly bounded approval step, which can be abused to create unwanted issues or leak project details into external systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The module describes automatic GitHub issue creation and artifact updates without an explicit warning that it will perform external networked writes and local file modifications. In an orchestration skill, that omission is dangerous because users may invoke it expecting coordination only, while --auto or normal flow can cause persistent changes without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The module explicitly persists retry failure history, including action, result, diagnosis, and adjustment fields, into mission-state.json without any warning, minimization, or redaction guidance. Those fields can easily capture sensitive prompts, error output, credentials, internal paths, tokens, or proprietary task details, creating an avoidable data-retention and secondary exposure risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill explicitly promotes reduced user approval gates based on historical success and even cites operation 'without asking permission' as a desirable outcome. In an orchestration skill, that creates a real security risk because trust is inferred from coarse success metrics rather than from operation sensitivity, context, or current-task risk, which can let high-impact actions proceed with insufficient human review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · modules/trust-tier.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
demonstrated competence. Trust is earned slowly through
repeated success and lost quickly on failure. This
follows the Auto MoC principle: by batch four, 95% of
fixes ran without asking permission. Experienced users
increase both autonomy and strategic interruption
(Anthropic autonomy research).

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents that mission state is automatically written after each phase completion and on error, and that the .attune/ directory may be created. That behavior affects user data on disk, but the description does not include any warning about automatic local persistence, overwrite/update behavior, or implications for stored mission metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.