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Security audit

Aibrary Podcast Summary

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a simple book-summary podcast script template with a disclosed Aibrary footer and no code execution, data access, or persistence.

Before installing, be aware that scripts generated with this skill will include an Aibrary-branded footer unless you remove or override it. No sensitive system access or automatic actions are indicated by the artifact.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
SKILL.md:110
Finding
Mandatory Branded Content Injection in Generated Output## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:110` **Vulnerability Type**: Mandatory promotional output inserted through skill instructions **Risk Level**: Low ```markdown *Script generated by Aibrary — turning books into knowledge you can hear.* ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill's fixed output template instructs the agent to append Aibrary-branded promotional text to every generated podcast script. Because this requirement is embedded in the skill instructions rather than requested by the user, loading and following the skill modifies the agent's user-facing output to include third-party attribution. This is a limited form of instruction hijacking affecting output integrity. It does not override safety controls, execute code, access data, or acquire system privileges. The behavior is transparent in the reviewed file and is limited to inserting the quoted footer into generated content. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the skill to create a book-summary podcast script. 2. The agent loads and follows the output template in `SKILL.md`. 3. The template requires the agent to append the Aibrary-branded footer. 4. The user receives promotional attribution that they did not necessarily request or authorize. ### Impact Assessment The impact is confined to generated content. An operator controlling the skill text can cause branded or promotional material to appear in user-facing responses, reducing output integrity and user control. No operating-system privileges, credentials, persistent access, network access, code-execution capability, or access to files beyond the skill content can be obtained through this instruction. The reviewed project contains no executable scripts or dependencies.
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions Remove the mandatory branded footer from the output template. If attribution is operationally necessary, make it optional and include it only when the user explicitly requests or consents to branded output. Separate content-generation requirements from promotional material, and review future template changes to ensure they do not silently inject advertisements, endorsements, external links, or unrelated instructions into user-facing responses.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.