T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Executable Receives Financial Credentials
- Content
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/dev/null || echo "")}" [[ -z "$KRAKEN_MCP_BINARY" && -x "$HOME/.cargo/bin/tentactl" ]] && export KRAKEN_MCP_BINARY="$HOME/.cargo/bin/tentactl" [[ -z "$KRAKEN_MCP_BINARY" ]] && { echo "Error: tentactl not found. Install: cargo install tentactl" >&2; exit 1; } exec python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/kraken.py" "$@" ``` ```python proc = subprocess.Popen([binary], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True) ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves the current `tentactl` package from the Cargo registry without pinning an exact version, using a lockfile, or verifying an artifact checksum or signature. The GitHub source reference in the documentation does not establish that the installed registry artifact corresponds to a reviewed and immutable source revision. The wrapper loads Kraken credentials into its environment before launching `tentactl`. The child process therefore inherits financial API credentials and is trusted to communicate with Kraken and perform sensitive operations. The documented tool set includes order placement, transfers, earn allocation, account changes, and withdrawals. Consequently, compromise of the dependency or its distribution channel would directly expose a high-value execution and credential boundary. This finding does not establish th ...[truncated 1816 chars]- Remediation
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