T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:5- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Permit Supply-Chain Substitution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt:5-12
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and integrity-unverified dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
text # Gemini API google-genai # PDF Processing pymupdf # Pydantic pydantic-settings pydanticThe installation instructions execute:
bash pip install -r requirements.txtRelated locations include
SKILL.md:10-19,SKILL.md:34-35, andskill.json:7.Technical Analysis
Every third-party dependency is declared without an exact version. The project also has no reviewed lockfile, package hashes, or enforced integrity verification. Consequently, each installation resolves whatever compatible release the configured Python package index serves at that time.
The package names are consistent with the documented libraries, and the audit found no evidence that the current names are intentionally malicious. However, the installation process remains mutable. A compromised upstream release, account takeover, malicious package-index configuration, or dependency-resolution change could cause users to install code that was never reviewed as part of this Skill.
Python packages execute imported code at runtime and may also exercise installation-time build behavior. Dependency substitution can therefore turn the documented setup command into a code-execution path.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a declared package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package index used by the victim.
- The attacker publishes or serves a malicious release that satisfies the unrestricted dependency declaration.
- A user follows
SKILL.md:35orskill.json:7and runspip install -r requirements.txt. - Because no versions or hashes are enforced, pip accepts the attacker-controlled artifact.
- Malicious code executes during installation, import, or normal Skill operation.
- The code runs with the privileges of the user installing or invoking the Skill.
Impact
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- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example with
package==X.Y.Z. - Generate a lockfile that records the complete transitive dependency graph.
- Require cryptographic hashes during installation, such as a pip-compatible requirements file used with
pip install --require-hashes. - Obtain packages exclusively from an explicitly configured trusted index and enforce TLS certificate validation.
- Review dependency provenance and release changes before updating locked versions.
- Add automated vulnerability and supply-chain scanning to the release process.
- Test dependency updates in an isolated environment before publishing them.
- Update
SKILL.mdandskill.jsonso all documented installation paths use the same locked, hash-verified dependency set.
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example with
