AI API Test

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 9:10 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a small user-directed API testing skill with local report output, with no evidence of hidden exfiltration, privilege escalation, or persistence beyond saved reports.

Install only if you are comfortable with the skill sending test requests to URLs you provide and saving local markdown reports. Avoid testing endpoints that return secrets, tokens, personal data, or confidential internal error details unless you are comfortable with the first 200 response characters being written to disk.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (9)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The natural-language content of the skill, including its description, capabilities, usage instructions, and pricing, is presented only in Chinese. This imposes a language constraint on users without any explicit opt-in or justification that the skill is region-specific.

Unsafe Defaults

Medium

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

SCRIPT_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
OUTPUT_DIR = SCRIPT_DIR / "output"

def test_api_endpoint(url, method="GET", auth=False):
    """测试 API 端点"""
    try:
        import requests

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The script stores server response content, including a preview of up to 200 characters, into a local markdown report file without any consent prompt, redaction, or sensitivity checks. If the tested endpoint returns secrets, personal data, tokens, or internal error details, this behavior can create unintended local data exposure and persistence beyond the test session.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

print("  test    <url> [method] [auth] - Test API endpoint")
        print("\nExamples:")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/users POST")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/login POST auth")
        sys.exit(1)

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

print("  test    <url> [method] [auth] - Test API endpoint")
        print("\nExamples:")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/users POST")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/login POST auth")
        sys.exit(1)

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

print("  test    <url> [method] [auth] - Test API endpoint")
        print("\nExamples:")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/users POST")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/login POST auth")
        sys.exit(1)

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

print("  test    <url> [method] [auth] - Test API endpoint")
        print("\nExamples:")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/users POST")
        print("  python3 main.py test https://api.example.com/login POST auth")
        sys.exit(1)

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The docstring for the main API test function is written only in Chinese, which imposes a language choice without user opt-in. Under the policy, language-specific behavior or instructions should either offer a choice or clearly justify the locale restriction.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The package description includes Chinese text ("自动化 API 测试和监控") alongside English, which may impose or assume a specific language presentation without documenting user opt-in or locale constraints. Under the language/locale policy, natural-language content should not force a language unless choice or justification is provided.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.