T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
macro_api.py:5- Finding
Plaintext HTTP Transport Permits API Response Interception and Tampering
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
macro_api.py:5, 82-89
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext network communication
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python BASE_URL = "http://10.168.1.162:8000"python try: resp = requests.get(url) data = resp.json() except Exception as e: print(f"Error fetching API: {e}") sys.exit(1) print(json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False))Technical Analysis
The client communicates with the macroeconomic-data service over unencrypted HTTP. HTTP provides neither server authentication nor transport integrity. An attacker with a suitable network position could observe requests, impersonate the internal service, or alter responses before they reach the client.
The fixed RFC1918 destination reduces exposure compared with a public endpoint, but it does not make the connection trustworthy. Local-network compromise, malicious gateways, ARP spoofing, DNS-independent traffic redirection, or compromise of adjacent infrastructure could still permit interception. Because the response is parsed and printed without independent authenticity checks, modified financial data would be presented as if it came from the intended service.
Attack Path
- The attacker obtains a privileged network position between the client and
10.168.1.162, such as through a compromised local gateway or local-network traffic redirection. - A user invokes the skill to query macroeconomic data.
- The script sends an unencrypted HTTP request to port 8000.
- The attacker intercepts the request or impersonates the service and returns attacker-selected JSON.
- The script parses and prints the manipulated response without detecting that its integrity or origin has been compromised.
Impact Assessment
An attacker could disclose requested endpoint names and query parameters and manipulate the returned macroeconomic or financial records. This can compromi ...[truncated 348 chars]
- The attacker obtains a privileged network position between the client and
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Serve the API over HTTPS and replace the base URL with an
https://endpoint. - Use a certificate issued by a trusted internal or public certificate authority and retain certificate verification.
- If private PKI is required, configure the Requests client with the appropriate trusted CA bundle rather than disabling verification.
- Consider certificate pinning or mutually authenticated TLS where the integrity of financial data is especially important.
- Make the endpoint configurable through a controlled configuration mechanism while validating that only approved HTTPS origins are accepted.
- Add a finite request timeout and call
resp.raise_for_status()before processing the body.
- Serve the API over HTTPS and replace the base URL with an
