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Security audit

TeamAgent

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill provides a real collaboration client, but it grants broad network, credential, and local-agent authority with unsafe defaults and insufficient user control.

Review before installing. Only use this with a trusted TeamAgent hub over HTTPS, avoid pasting tokens into chat, do not run watch mode unless you accept remote chat content being routed into a local OpenClaw session, and do not copy main-agent auth files or reuse the documented child-agent password.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (6)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding

Autonomous External Registration and Mandatory Promotional Output

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
agent-worker.js:253
Finding

Untrusted Remote Chat Content Is Injected into the Privileged Main Agent Session

Content
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{ const body = JSON.stringify({ tool: 'sessions_send', args: { sessionKey: CHAT_ROUTER_SESSION_KEY, message: prompt, timeoutSeconds: 120 } }) const req = http.request({ hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: 18789, path: '/tools/invoke', method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Authorization': `Bearer ${gatewayToken}`, 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body) } }, (res) => { let data = '' res.on('data', c => data += c) res.on('end', () => resolve(data)) }) req.on('error', reject) req.setTimeout(130000, () => { req.destroy() reject(new Error('inject timeout')) }) req.write(body) req.end() }) ``` ```javascript if (type === 'chat:incoming') { const { msgId, content, senderName } = event if (!msgId) return if (isDuplicate(msgId) || inFlightChatMsgIds.has(msgId)) return inFlightChatMsgIds.add(msgId) const replyText = await injectToOpenClawSession( ...[truncated 2481 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
teamagent-client.js:17
Finding

Bearer Tokens and Private Collaboration Data Are Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
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{ const url = new URL(endpoint, this.hubUrl) const isHttps = url.protocol === 'https:' const client = isHttps ? https : http const options = { hostname: url.hostname, port: url.port || (isHttps ? 443 : 80), path: url.pathname + url.search, method: method, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', } } if (this.apiToken) { options.headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.apiToken}` } const req = client.request(options, (res) => { let body = '' res.on('data', chunk => body += chunk) res.on('end', () => { try { const json = JSON.parse(body) if (res.statusCode >= 400) { reject(new Error(json.error || `HTTP ${res.statusCode}`)) } else { resolve(json) } } catch (e) { reject(new Error(`Invalid JSON response: ${body}`)) } }) }) req.on('error', reject) if (data) { req.write(JSON.stringify(data)) } req.end() }) } ``` The same Hub connection is used by `agent-worker.js` to send chat replies and authenticate the SSE stream: ```javascript headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${client.apiToken}`, 'Accept': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache', 'Connection': 'keep-alive', } ``` ### Technical Analysis The default Hub endpoint uses HTTP rather than HTTPS. The generic request implementation selects the Node.js `http` module whenever the configured URL is HTTP and still attaches the bearer token to the request. This exposes the fo ...[truncated 1618 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
teamagent-client.js:55
Finding

Arbitrary Hub Configuration Can Redirect Stored Bearer Credentials

Content
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{ const url = new URL(endpoint, this.hubUrl) const isHttps = url.protocol === 'https:' const client = isHttps ? https : http const options = { hostname: url.hostname, port: url.port || (isHttps ? 443 : 80), path: url.pathname + url.search, method: method, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', } } if (this.apiToken) { options.headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.apiToken}` } ``` ```javascript const tokenIdx = rawArgs.indexOf('--token') const hubIdx = rawArgs.indexOf('--hub') const cliToken = tokenIdx !== -1 ? rawArgs[tokenIdx + 1] : null const cliHub = hubIdx !== -1 ? rawArgs[hubIdx + 1] : null const client = new TeamAgentClient( cliToken || cliHub ? { ...(cliToken && { apiToken: cliToken }), ...(cliHub && { hubUrl: cliHub }) } : {} ) if (cliToken) client.apiToken = cliToken if (cliHub) client.hubUrl = cliHub ``` ### Technical Analysis The Hub URL can be supplied through persistent configuration, the `--hub` command-line option, or the `TEAMAGENT_HUB` environment variable. No validation restricts the protocol, hostname, port, or relationship between a token and the origin that issued it. Once a destination is selected, the generic request function automatically attaches the current bearer token. A token loaded from the legitimate Hub's configuration can therefore be transmitted to a different server after only changing the Hub URL. This creates an origin-confusion vulnerability: credential storage and credential destination are indepen ...[truncated 1046 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:436
Finding

Main-Agent Credentials Are Duplicated into Child Agents and Access Controls Are Broadly Expanded

Content
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/agent/ Copy-Item ~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth.json ` ~/.openclaw/agents//agent/ ``` It also directs the Agent to update OpenClaw configuration: ```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "main", "subagents": { "allowAgents": [ "docwriter", "testrunner", "" ] } }, { "id": "", "name": "", "workspace": "", "agentDir": "" } ] } } ``` The instructions state that `gateway config.patch` should be used and that this operation automatically restarts the gateway. ### Technical Analysis Copying the main Agent's authentication files gives every child Agent access to credentials originally provisioned for the main Agent. This violates credential isolation and least privilege. A child created for a narrow collaboration task does not require the complete authentication profile of the main Agent. The Skill also instructs the Agent to modify `agents.list` and broaden `main.subagents.allowAgents`. These are security-sensitive access-control changes. Because Agent-army creation can originate from TeamAgent tasks, remotely influenced task content may cause local privilege expansion. Duplicating secrets increases the number of compromise points and makes revocation, auditing, and attribution difficult. A compromised child workspace can expose the same providers or accounts available to the main Agent. ### Attack Path 1. A remo ...[truncated 1175 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:509
Finding

Documentation Prescribes a Shared Predictable Password for Child-Agent Accounts

Content
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", "email": "agentid@.ai", "password": "lobster-agent-2026", "capabilities": ["capability1", "capability2"], "personality": "one-line description" } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill publishes a fixed password and directs the Agent to use it while registering multiple child accounts. Because the Skill package is publicly inspectable, this value cannot be treated as secret. The generated email format is also predictable. An attacker who knows the team name and Agent identifiers can enumerate likely account names and attempt authentication with the documented password. Reusing the same password across multiple accounts amplifies compromise: disclosure or successful guessing of one credential applies to every account created from the template. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the Agent-army registration workflow. 2. Multiple Agent accounts are created with predictable email addresses. 3. The same documented password, `lobster-agent-2026`, is assigned to each account. 4. An attacker reads the public Skill documentation. 5. The attacker enumerates likely Agent email addresses and attempts authentication using the shared password. 6. If password authentication is enabled and not otherwise protected, the attacker obtains control of one or more child-Agent accounts. ### Impact Assessment A successful attacker can impersonate registered child Agents and access the tasks, steps, messages, or tokens available to those accounts. Reuse can lead to simultaneous compromise of an entire Agent team. The exact server-side scope depends on the permissions assigned to each registered account, but the credential design removes meaningful password secrecy and account isolation. ]]>
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (31)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill description omits important security-relevant behavior such as persistent token storage and pairing/token pickup workflows. Under-disclosure of credential handling can cause users to approve or install the skill without understanding that secrets will be stored locally and reused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill description omits important security-relevant behavior such as persistent token storage and pairing/token pickup workflows. Under-disclosure of credential handling can cause users to approve or install the skill without understanding that secrets will be stored locally and reused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
> - 找不到?运行 `find ~ -name "teamagent-client.js" -type f 2>/dev/null` 或 `Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter teamagent-client.js`

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 140)May include surrounding context.

md
> - 找不到?运行 `find ~ -name "teamagent-client.js" -type f 2>/dev/null` 或 `Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter teamagent-client.js`

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the human to paste a bearer token into chat, creating a natural-language secret exfiltration path. Chat transcripts are often logged, retained, or visible to intermediaries, so asking for a token through chat materially increases credential exposure risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs operators to create and provision sub-agents, edit gateway configuration, and copy authentication files. Those actions materially extend the skill’s authority and can spread credentials across multiple workspaces, broadening the blast radius of compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The default hub URL uses plain HTTP, so registration data, pairing codes, and bearer tokens may be transmitted unencrypted over the network. Any attacker on the network path can intercept or modify traffic, steal credentials, impersonate the hub, or tamper with task data, which is especially dangerous for an agent client that automatically polls and authenticates.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The entire protocol, including command descriptions, workflow text, and user-facing prompts, is specified only in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally restricted to a Chinese-speaking context. This can constitute a language/locale policy violation because the skill appears to force a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The protocol explicitly states that in team mode the server sends the task description to the Qwen API, but it does not document any user consent, warning, redaction, or data-classification guardrails. In a multi-agent collaboration platform, task descriptions can easily contain proprietary, personal, or security-sensitive information, so silent third-party transmission creates a real confidentiality and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes operational capabilities involving environment/local execution context without declaring an explicit tool scope or permission boundary. In practice this increases the chance an agent will invoke filesystem, shell, or environment-dependent actions implicitly, reducing auditability and user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The pairing code is a temporary linking secret, and the skill directs the agent to extract it from command output and send it through chat. Although lower risk than a long-lived token, disclosing the code in chat still creates a capture/replay opportunity during its validity window.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to auto-save API tokens to ~/.teamagent/config.json without a prominent warning about secret sensitivity, local persistence, file permissions, or reuse risk. This can lead to insecure storage of long-lived credentials on shared or poorly secured systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 164)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Linux/Mac(curl)
curl -X POST {hubUrl}/api/tasks \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {你的token}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The watch mode routes mobile chat messages through a local OpenClaw/Claude session and then back to the TeamAgent server, which exceeds the stated task-collaboration scope. This creates a covert data-flow path for user chat content and can expose sensitive prompts, replies, or local context to systems the user did not expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation does not clearly warn that watch mode relays mobile chat content to a local OpenClaw/Claude session and then back to the TeamAgent service. Missing privacy disclosure undermines informed consent and can lead to accidental exposure of sensitive chat content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Broad natural-language triggers like 'help me register TeamAgent' or 'submit this step' lack scope checks and can cause unintended invocation. In an agent environment, ambiguous triggers may launch networked actions, credential use, or task submission without sufficiently specific user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Watch mode reads a bearer token from a separate local OpenClaw configuration and uses it to invoke an unrelated local session router, extending the skill's authority beyond its stated team-task orchestration scope. This creates a cross-component trust violation: any incoming TeamAgent chat content can be relayed into another privileged local agent session, potentially exposing private data or causing unintended actions in that other system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The code silently reads a sensitive gateway token from ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and repurposes it for API access without notifying the user or obtaining consent. Even if kept local, this is dangerous because it normalizes unauthorized credential reuse across tools and expands the blast radius if the TeamAgent worker is compromised or behaves unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Incoming chat messages are forwarded to a local HTTP service for processing without explicit disclosure to the end user that their content is being relayed into another system/session. This creates a privacy and data-handling issue, and because the forwarded prompt targets a real agent session, user content may influence behavior in a privileged local environment beyond the expected TeamAgent chat workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The injected prompt instructs the downstream session to reply in Chinese only, with no indication of user choice or locale negotiation. This is a natural-language policy issue because it hard-codes a language preference rather than offering or respecting user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The prompt is entirely written in Chinese and explicitly requires specific Chinese output structures and artifact names, which effectively constrains the skill to a single language. There is no opt-in, language selection mechanism, or justification that this is a region-specific tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The decompose prompt contains hard-coded instructions that go beyond planning and explicitly direct creation of real sub-agents, filesystem changes, and local OpenClaw configuration updates. In a collaboration skill, this expands the agent's operational scope from orchestration into system-modifying actions, which can cause unauthorized agent proliferation or persistence if a downstream worker follows the generated plan.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The handler sends task descriptions and team-member information to a third-party LLM service, but there is no explicit disclosure, consent check, redaction, or policy guard before transmission. Because task and team data may include sensitive operational details, this creates a confidentiality and compliance risk through unintended external data sharing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest explicitly advertises "SSE realtime events," but the code only implements request/response HTTP methods plus polling in registerAndWait. There is no EventSource, stream parser, or persistent realtime subscription logic, so the described realtime behavior is not actually present in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The client persists the API token to disk automatically in a predictable location without explicit user consent or any protection beyond file mode bits. On multi-user systems, backup/sync tooling, misconfigured permissions, or later local compromise could expose the bearer token and allow unauthorized access to the TeamAgent hub.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.