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Security audit

Mmx

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent MiniMax CLI reference, but it under-discloses credential and external data-handling risks for a broad multimodal tool.

Review this skill before installing if you will use MiniMax with sensitive prompts, private media, or paid API credentials. Prefer an interactive or secret-safe login method instead of putting API keys in shell commands, confirm before sending local files or personal content to MiniMax, and direct generated media to a dedicated output folder with unique filenames.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

API Key Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
# Check region: mmx config show ``` ### Technical Analysis The authentication example instructs users to provide the MiniMax API key directly through the `--api-key` command-line argument. Secrets passed this way may be exposed in: - Shell history files - Process listings or process-monitoring tools while the command is running - Terminal session recordings - Command execution telemetry and audit logs - CI/CD job logs or wrapper-script diagnostics Although the example uses a placeholder rather than a hardcoded credential, users following the instruction are expected to replace it with a real API key. The document does not provide or recommend a safer mechanism such as an interactive hidden prompt, standard input, or a protected credential store. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented authentication procedure and replaces `` with a valid MiniMax API key. 2. The shell records the complete command in its history, or the command is captured by process monitoring, terminal logging, or CI telemetry. 3. A local user, monitoring service, log reader, or attacker with access to those records retrieves the exposed key. 4. The attacker authenticates to MiniMax using the recovered credential. 5. The attacker invokes services permitted by the key, potentially consuming account quota or accessing resources associated with the affected account. Exploitation requires access to process metadata, shell history, terminal records, or execution logs containing the command. ### Impact Assessment A recovered key may allow unauthorized use of the MiniMax account and the text, image, video, speech, music, vision, or search capabilities authorized for that credenti ...[truncated 331 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
mmx text chat --message "What is MiniMax?"

# Streaming
mmx text chat --model MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed --message "Hello" --stream

# With system prompt
mmx text chat --system "You are a coding assistant" --message "Fizzbuzz in Go"

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The activation description is very broad ('when Arif wants to generate content or analyze images'), which can cause the skill to trigger in many unrelated contexts. Because this skill can invoke an external multimodal provider, broad activation increases the chance of unnecessary data disclosure, unintended external API use, and accidental side effects such as content generation or remote analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill is centered on sending text prompts, images, audio, and search queries to the MiniMax service, but it does not clearly warn users that their inputs will be transmitted to an external provider. In a multimodal skill, this omission materially increases privacy and data-handling risk because users may provide sensitive media or prompts assuming processing is local.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The documentation includes commands that create or overwrite local output files and directories (for example, writing images, audio, and video to disk) without warning the user. This can lead to unintended filesystem changes, overwriting existing files, or generating artifacts containing sensitive content without explicit user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.