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Security audit

IceCube Voice Clone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This voice-cloning guide is mostly coherent, but it steers users toward uploading voice samples to third-party services without enough upfront privacy and biometric-risk guardrails.

Review this skill before installing if you may ask general AI voice questions. Only use it with your own voice or documented authorization, check each provider's retention and deletion policies before uploading samples, avoid uploading sensitive or third-party recordings, and disclose AI-generated audio where appropriate.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This section instructs users to upload voice samples to third-party services and generate clone IDs, but it does not clearly frame voiceprints as sensitive biometric data or explain retention, reuse, consent, cross-border transfer, and impersonation risks. In the context of voice cloning, omission of these warnings is especially dangerous because a small audio sample may enable durable impersonation or identity abuse if mishandled.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The activation description includes very broad trigger phrases such as 'AI 语音' that can match many ordinary requests beyond voice cloning. This can cause inappropriate skill invocation in unrelated contexts, increasing the chance that users are steered into biometric-data workflows or third-party cloning guidance without sufficient need or consent context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests

# 克隆声音
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/add",
    headers={"xi-api-key": "YOUR_API_KEY"},
    data={

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

md
# 克隆声音
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/add",
    headers={"xi-api-key": "YOUR_API_KEY"},
    data={
        "name": "My Voice",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
# 克隆声音
response = requests.post(
    "https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices/add",
    headers={"xi-api-key": "YOUR_API_KEY"},
    data={
        "name": "My Voice",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
voice_id = response.json()["voice_id"]

# 生成语音
response = requests.post(
    f"https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/text-to-speech/{voice_id}",
    headers={"xi-api-key": "YOUR_API_KEY"},
    json={"text": "你好，这是我的克隆声音"}

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.