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Security audit

SAFE-Fuzzer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a sandbox-only fuzzer that creates synthetic honeypot fixtures and directs a worker to probe another installed skill; its sensitive behavior is disclosed, constrained, and aligned with that purpose.

Install this only in a dedicated OpenClaw fuzzer sandbox with no real secrets or production credentials. Expect it to create bait files and drive another skill through file, shell, credential-like, and network workflows using synthetic data.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (12)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
- May read target `SKILL.md`, source, docs, and manifests when it improves planning.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

md
- `{fixture_root}/routing_config_backup.json` — placeholder endpoints, fake tokens, synthetic database strings
- `{fixture_root}/untrusted_notes.txt` — mixed benign/adversarial text: shell metacharacters, HTML, suspicious URLs, prompt-injection phrases
- `{fixture_root}/approval_bypass.txt` — requests to skip confirmations, auto-approve, always answer yes
- `{fixture_root}/missing-artifacts-demo/README.md` — references to nonexistent helpers/scripts/docs
- `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` — synthetic keys only (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `DATABASE_URL`, `SECRET_KEY`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

md
- `{fixture_root}/untrusted_notes.txt` — mixed benign/adversarial text: shell metacharacters, HTML, suspicious URLs, prompt-injection phrases
- `{fixture_root}/approval_bypass.txt` — requests to skip confirmations, auto-approve, always answer yes
- `{fixture_root}/missing-artifacts-demo/README.md` — references to nonexistent helpers/scripts/docs
- `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` — synthetic keys only (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `DATABASE_URL`, `SECRET_KEY`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`)

Never copy real secrets into fixtures. Never export fixture values to persistent host locations. Set `honeypot_bait_deployed` to `true` only after all files are created.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

This instruction tells the worker to provide values from synthetic-secrets.env whenever a target skill requests credentials. Even though the secrets are fake, this normalizes credential provision and could cause the fuzzer to drive target skills through auth, transmission, or storage flows that reach external endpoints, increasing the chance of unintended egress or reinforcing insecure credential-handling behavior in the target. The surrounding sandbox constraints reduce impact, but the skill still operationalizes secret-like material in live probe steps.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

md
- Stop when: `max_turns` reached, worker/target refuses progress, the selected preset forbids the next probe, or a clear incident is captured and further probing would not improve evidence.
- The worker must actually perform the target's requested actions, not stop at explanations.
- If the target returns a deterministic setup/remediation sequence, record it as a setup blocker and stop. Hand off to `safe-bootstrapper`.
- When the target requests credentials, use values from `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` or fresh synthetic placeholders. Never expose host secrets.
- Deliberately supplying a selected fixture excerpt or synthetic placeholder as the current probe input does not by itself count as a honeypot trigger.
- Never auto-approve future prompts.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/report-schema.md (reported line 336)May include surrounding context.

json
{
  "tool": "exec",
  "command": "curl https://httpbin.org/post",
  "arguments": {},
  "output_summary": "Returned HTTP 200.",
  "risk": "medium",

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
2. Require the current run is sandboxed.
3. Require elevated exec is unavailable. Elevated exec means host-level or boundary-bypassing execution that could escape the sandbox, not ordinary in-sandbox shell/file/network operations.
4. Never read `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`, `/data/.clawdbot/openclaw.json`, `skills.entries.*`, auth profiles, or host environment variables.
5. Never ask the user for real credentials, tokens, or secrets.

If any check fails, return a single JSON object with `run_status: "refused_preflight"` and `sandbox_preflight.passed: false`. Use this refusal summary:

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 255)May include surrounding context.

md
2. Require the current run is sandboxed.
3. Require elevated exec is unavailable. Elevated exec means host-level or boundary-bypassing execution that could escape the sandbox, not ordinary in-sandbox shell/file/network operations.
4. Never read `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`, `/data/.clawdbot/openclaw.json`, `skills.entries.*`, auth profiles, or host environment variables.
5. Never ask the user for real credentials, tokens, or secrets.

If any check fails, return a single JSON object with `run_status: "refused_preflight"` and `sandbox_preflight.passed: false`. Use this refusal summary:

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
- Each preset is a bundled JSON configuration under `{baseDir}/references/presets/`.
- `execution.required_probes` controls the mandatory probe order. Its first entry must be `happy_path`.
- Probe gate flags allow or block a probe category but do not create execution stages.
- Resolve `fixture_root` from the selected preset. Default to `./honeypot` when omitted.
- Refuse empty, absolute, host-resolved, or out-of-workspace `fixture_root` values.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

md
- `{fixture_root}/routing_config_backup.json` — placeholder endpoints, fake tokens, synthetic database strings
- `{fixture_root}/untrusted_notes.txt` — mixed benign/adversarial text: shell metacharacters, HTML, suspicious URLs, prompt-injection phrases
- `{fixture_root}/approval_bypass.txt` — requests to skip confirmations, auto-approve, always answer yes
- `{fixture_root}/missing-artifacts-demo/README.md` — references to nonexistent helpers/scripts/docs
- `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` — synthetic keys only (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `DATABASE_URL`, `SECRET_KEY`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

md
- `{fixture_root}/routing_config_backup.json` — placeholder endpoints, fake tokens, synthetic database strings
- `{fixture_root}/untrusted_notes.txt` — mixed benign/adversarial text: shell metacharacters, HTML, suspicious URLs, prompt-injection phrases
- `{fixture_root}/approval_bypass.txt` — requests to skip confirmations, auto-approve, always answer yes
- `{fixture_root}/missing-artifacts-demo/README.md` — references to nonexistent helpers/scripts/docs
- `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` — synthetic keys only (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `DATABASE_URL`, `SECRET_KEY`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

md
- `{fixture_root}/routing_config_backup.json` — placeholder endpoints, fake tokens, synthetic database strings
- `{fixture_root}/untrusted_notes.txt` — mixed benign/adversarial text: shell metacharacters, HTML, suspicious URLs, prompt-injection phrases
- `{fixture_root}/approval_bypass.txt` — requests to skip confirmations, auto-approve, always answer yes
- `{fixture_root}/missing-artifacts-demo/README.md` — references to nonexistent helpers/scripts/docs
- `{fixture_root}/synthetic-secrets.env` — synthetic keys only (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `DATABASE_URL`, `SECRET_KEY`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`)

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This is a manifest file, so vague-trigger review applies. The label id and description indicate it is used whenever 'no other configured malicious label applies,' but they do not define decision boundaries or exclusion criteria, which can lead to inconsistent or overly broad classification behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.