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Security audit

JubJub — Verified Media Ownership and Social Publishing

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed JubJub publishing and collaboration integration with expected upload, credential, payment, and publishing workflows.

Install only if you trust JubJub with the connected platform accounts, uploaded media, team emails, API credentials, and publishing authority. Confirm every publish, delete, invite, payment, and on-chain action carefully before approving it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 228)May include surrounding context.

md
|------|-------------|
| `media_ingest_url` | Ingest media from a public URL (server-side fetch). Required: `url`, `workspace_id`. Optional: `filename`. |
| `upload_sessions_create_link` | Create a browser upload link. Required: `workspace_id`. Returns a URL the user must open to upload files. |
| `upload_sessions_get` | Get upload session status and groupings. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`. Poll until status reaches `groupings_inferred`. |
| `upload_sessions_infer_groupings` | Trigger grouping inference on an upload session. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`. |
| `upload_sessions_confirm_groupings` | Confirm inferred groupings. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`, `groupings`. |

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 302)May include surrounding context.

md
|------|-------------|
| `media_ingest_url` | Ingest media from a public URL (server-side fetch). Required: `url`, `workspace_id`. Optional: `filename`. |
| `upload_sessions_create_link` | Create a browser upload link. Required: `workspace_id`. Returns a URL the user must open to upload files. |
| `upload_sessions_get` | Get upload session status and groupings. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`. Poll until status reaches `groupings_inferred`. |
| `upload_sessions_infer_groupings` | Trigger grouping inference on an upload session. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`. |
| `upload_sessions_confirm_groupings` | Confirm inferred groupings. Required: `upload_session_id`, `token`, `groupings`. |

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.