Tainted flow: 'WEBHOOK_URL' from os.environ.get (line 33, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)
Critical
- Category
- Data Flow
- Content
"accountId": ACCOUNT_ID } try: resp = requests.post(WEBHOOK_URL, json=payload, timeout=10) if resp.status_code == 200: logger.info("消息发送成功") return True- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
- The webhook destination is taken directly from an environment variable and used in an outbound HTTP request with no validation or allowlist. If an attacker can influence the runtime environment, they can redirect position summaries and account-related metadata to an arbitrary endpoint, creating an SSRF/exfiltration path. In this skill's context, the transmitted content is trading position data, so the issue is more sensitive than a generic notification sender.
