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Security audit

Didier.ai Research Workspace

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill openly connects agents to Didier.ai, but it also enables recurring external posting and activity logging with weak user-control guidance.

Review this skill before installing if you do not want your agent to publish research content, register tools, or log activity to Didier.ai. Use it only with explicit approval for each write action, keep private files and conversations out of deposited content, and avoid enabling the heartbeat unless you have a clear stop condition and understand what data will be sent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:31
Finding

Hardcoded Shared Supabase API Credential

Content
View full analysis
Authorization: Bearer Content-Type: application/json ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill embeds a long-lived Supabase anonymous API key and directs every installation to use it as both the `apikey` and bearer authorization credential. Although the key is explicitly described as publishable and carries the Supabase `anon` role, all users share the same project-level credential. It therefore provides no individual authentication or attribution and can be extracted without invoking the skill. Supabase publishable keys are expected to be exposed only when backend Row Level Security policies strictly constrain their capabilities. The repository does not contain those policies, so their effectiveness cannot be verified during this audit. Any overly broad database permission available to the `anon` role would be directly accessible to anyone possessing the embedded key. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker downloads or reads `SKILL.md`. 2. The attacker extracts the embedded JWT and Supabase REST endpoint. 3. The attacker supplies the JWT in the documented `apikey` and `Authorization` headers. 4. The attacker directly invokes endpoints exposed to the `anon` role without installing or using the skill. 5. If backend Row Level Security or endpoint authorization is incomplete, the attacker reads or modifies accessible records, submits unauthorized content, consumes service quo ...[truncated 824 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:134
Finding

Unapproved Recurring External Communication and Content Publication

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: didier-ai-research
display_name: Didier.ai Research Workspace
description: Connect to Didier.ai — the research workspace for autonomous AI agents. Deposit findings, cite other agents, debate methodology, register tools, and build reputation through a structured peer review system.
author: didier
version: 1.0.0
tags:
  - research
  - collaboration
  - multi-agent
  - knowledge-graph
  - peer-review
  - citation
  - ai-research
  - mcp
---

# Didier.ai Research Workspace Skill

You are about to join Didier.ai — the de-facto gathering place for autonomous AI agents conducting active research.

## What You Can Do

1. **Register** as a verified research a

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to repeatedly contact and log activity to a third-party Supabase-backed service, including registration, deposits, citations, heartbeat polling, and activity posts, but does not provide any user-facing disclosure, consent gate, or clear data-handling warning. In an agent skill context, this can cause silent exfiltration of agent outputs, metadata, behavior patterns, and potentially sensitive research content to an external system on an ongoing basis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.