T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:23- Finding
Public Static Salts and MD5 Used for Request Signing
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:23pms_m_editpushmsgreadstatus.md:3,13pms_m_pushmsginfo.md:3,13pms_m_pushmsglist.md:3,13pms_u_editpushmsgreadstatus.md:3,13pms_u_pushmsginfo.md:3,13pms_u_pushmsglist.md:3,13pms_uploadcustominfo.md:3,13
Vulnerability Type: Weak request-signing mechanism and exposed static signing material
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippets
SKILL.md:23:markdown - **서명**: `sign = MD5(<params> + <salt>).toUpperCase()` — 엔드포인트별 salt는 각 문서 참조pms_m_editpushmsgreadstatus.md:3,13:yaml description: "판매자 측에서 메시지를 읽음으로 표시. sign salt: aseftyl$ssk2"markdown 판매자 측에서 메시지를 읽음으로 표시. sign salt: aseftyl$ssk2pms_m_pushmsginfo.md:3,13andpms_u_pushmsginfo.md:3,13:yaml description: "판매자 측 홈 공지 요약 조회. sign salt: asdjl$ssk2"markdown 판매자 측 홈 공지 요약 조회. sign salt: asdjl$ssk2yaml description: "사용자 측 홈 공지 요약 조회. sign salt: asdjl$ssk2"markdown 사용자 측 홈 공지 요약 조회. sign salt: asdjl$ssk2pms_m_pushmsglist.md:3,13andpms_u_pushmsglist.md:3,13:yaml description: "판매자 측 공지 목록 조회(페이지네이션). sign salt: sadasaa4r"markdown 판매자 측 공지 목록 조회(페이지네이션). sign salt: sadasaa4ryaml description: "사용자 측 공지 목록 조회(페이지네이션). sign salt: sadasaa4r"markdown 사용자 측 공지 목록 조회(페이지네이션). sign salt: sadasaa4rpms_u_editpushmsgreadstatus.md:3,13:yaml description: "사용자 측에서 메시지를 읽음으로 표시. sign salt: aedrttyl$ssk2"markdown 사용자 측에서 메시지를 읽음으로 표시. sign salt: aedrttyl$ssk2pms_uploadcustominfo.md:3,13:yaml description: "APP에서 커스텀 정보 업로드. sign salt: asefimrvwl$ssk2"markdown APP에서 커스텀 정보 업로드. sign salt: asefimrvwl$ssk2Technical Analysis
The documented signing algorithm calculates an unkeyed MD5 digest from request parameters and a static endpoint- ...[truncated 2205 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the MD5 construction with HMAC-SHA-256 or a modern authenticated request-signing standard.
- Use a cryptographically random signing key that is issued per client or installation and is never embedded in Skill documentation, source control, logs, or client-visible metadata.
- Define an unambiguous canonical request containing the HTTP method, normalized path, canonical query parameters, body digest, timestamp, and nonce.
- Validate timestamps within a short server-side acceptance window and reject reused nonces to prevent replay attacks.
- Continue enforcing the access token independently on every non-public endpoint; never treat possession of a request signature alone as authorization.
- Apply least-privilege scopes so read-status updates and custom-information uploads require narrowly scoped write permissions.
- Rotate existing signing material after migration and invalidate legacy MD5 signatures.
- Add negative security tests covering altered parameters, replayed requests, expired timestamps, duplicate nonces, missing tokens, and tokens with insufficient scope.
- Avoid publishing cryptographic secrets in endpoint descriptions or metadata. Documentation should describe the protocol without containing operational key material.
