tracking-twitter-thought-leaders

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 3, 2026 · 6:39 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Twitter/X research workflow that uses Apify, with privacy and token-handling cautions but no hidden or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending Twitter/X search terms, target usernames, and related research parameters to Apify. Set APIFY_TOKEN carefully, avoid exposing it in shared shell history or logs, and confirm before saving scraped results to local files.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (5)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The example actor input sets `"tweetLanguage": "en"`, which constrains results to English even though the skill earlier treats geography/language as optional. This is a natural-language locale policy issue because the skill imposes a language choice by default rather than offering or confirming the user's preferred language.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs sending user-supplied search terms and an API token to an external third-party service via `curl`. External transmission is expected for this skill's purpose, but it remains security-relevant because sensitive queries, account lists, and credentials are sent off-platform, and the token is exposed in a command-line pattern that may be logged in shell history or process listings.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~twitter-user-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"usernames": ["[username1]", "[username2]"]}'
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The profile enrichment step transmits candidate usernames to Apify's external API, which may reveal the user's research targets, outreach plans, or monitoring interests to a third party. This is expected behavior for a scraping-based workflow, but without clear consent and secret-handling guidance it remains a genuine external transmission risk.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~twitter-user-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"usernames": ["[username1]", "[username2]"]}'
```

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The profile enrichment step transmits candidate usernames to Apify's external API, which may reveal the user's research targets, outreach plans, or monitoring interests to a third party. This is expected behavior for a scraping-based workflow, but without clear consent and secret-handling guidance it remains a genuine external transmission risk.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The skill includes examples that save output to local files automatically, but it does not warn the user that executing those commands will write data to disk. In an agent setting, silent file creation can violate user expectations, overwrite existing files, or persist scraped data without explicit consent, even though the examples themselves are not overtly malicious.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.