scraping-google-search-results

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 3, 2026 · 6:37 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill does what it claims, but it sends arbitrary Google search queries to Apify and shows API-token-in-URL commands without enough privacy or credential-handling guidance.

Review this before installing if you may search for confidential, personal, regulated, or client-sensitive terms. Prefer the MCP or SDK path over the REST fallback, avoid putting API tokens in URLs, and only export datasets when you are allowed to store and handle the resulting search data.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The trigger scope is very broad, covering generic requests for Google results and 'any query,' which increases the chance the skill is invoked in situations the user did not clearly intend. That can lead to unreviewed third-party data transmission and scraping actions for arbitrary user-provided content, including sensitive or regulated queries.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The skill promotes scraping and dataset export without warning about privacy, data handling, or terms-of-service implications. In practice, users may submit personal, confidential, or regulated search terms to a third-party service without understanding retention, sharing, or compliance consequences.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~google-search-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"queries": ["query1", "query2"], "maxPagesPerQuery": 1}'

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: This command sends user-supplied query data to Apify and includes the API token directly in the URL, which can leak through shell history, logs, proxies, or monitoring systems. External transmission is expected for the feature, but the token-handling pattern and lack of sensitivity guidance create a real security risk.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Fetch results:
```bash
curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&format=json"
```

### Step 3: Handle Edge Cases

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Fetching dataset results with the token in the query string exposes credentials and may also retrieve potentially sensitive result data from a third-party service without warning. The skill context makes external access expected, but the example still encourages insecure authentication and insufficient data-handling hygiene.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Fetch results:
```bash
curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&format=json"
```

### Step 3: Handle Edge Cases

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Fetching dataset results with the token in the query string exposes credentials and may also retrieve potentially sensitive result data from a third-party service without warning. The skill context makes external access expected, but the example still encourages insecure authentication and insufficient data-handling hygiene.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Fetch results:
```bash
curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&format=json"
```

### Step 3: Handle Edge Cases

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Fetching dataset results with the token in the query string exposes credentials and may also retrieve potentially sensitive result data from a third-party service without warning. The skill context makes external access expected, but the example still encourages insecure authentication and insufficient data-handling hygiene.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.