T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:98- Finding
API Credential Exposed Through URL Query Parameters
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
monitoring-twitter-for-competitor-job-posts
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill appears purpose-aligned, but its documented curl fallback can expose the user's Apify API token in URLs.
Install only if you are comfortable using Apify for Twitter/X scraping and can handle the token safely. Prefer the MCP/client helper or Authorization headers, use a narrowly scoped Apify token, avoid copying tokens into URLs, and rotate the token if you already ran the documented query-string curl commands in logged environments.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)
Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
REST API fallback:
bash curl -X POST \ "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"searchTerms": ["[COMPETITOR] hiring", "[COMPETITOR] join our team", "[COMPETITOR] job opening"], "maxItems": 100}'
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 50% confidence
- Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
REST API fallback:
bash curl -X POST \ "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"searchTerms": ["[COMPETITOR] hiring", "[COMPETITOR] join our team", "[COMPETITOR] job opening"], "maxItems": 100}'
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 87% confidence
- Finding
While fetching the dataset from Apify is expected behavior, this specific example again embeds the APIFY token directly in the URL. That creates a credential exposure risk through command history, logs, browser/tooling telemetry, and process inspection, turning an otherwise normal external request into a real security issue.
- Content
Wait for
SUCCEEDED. Fetch dataset:bash curl "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN"Step 3: Classify Results
Missing User Warnings
Low
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
The skill instructs users to pass the APIFY token in curl command URLs, which can expose the credential via shell history, process listings, terminal logs, proxies, and saved documentation. This is a genuine credential-handling weakness even though the token is intended for legitimate use, because the guidance normalizes an unsafe transmission pattern.
- Content
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.