T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:88- Finding
Apify API Token Exposed in URL Query String
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
monitoring-tiktok-mentions-of-brand
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is mostly a straightforward TikTok brand-monitoring guide, but it handles Apify credentials in an unsafe fallback command and does not clearly warn users about third-party data exposure.
Review this before installing or using it with sensitive brands, unreleased products, incident terms, or regulated data. Prefer Apify MCP or an API call that sends the token in an Authorization header, use a least-privilege Apify token, avoid storing secrets in shared .env files, and assume submitted keywords and collected results may be visible to Apify/Apidojo under their policies.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)
Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 90% confidence
- Finding
The skill instructs users to send brand keywords and retrieve monitoring results through Apify/Apidojo, but the user-facing description does not clearly warn that those inputs and collected data are transmitted to a third-party service. This can create an informed-consent and data-handling gap, especially when searches involve sensitive competitive intelligence, incident monitoring, or internal campaign terms.
- Content
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 84% confidence
- Finding
The skill explicitly posts user-supplied search keywords to an external Apify endpoint, which constitutes third-party data transmission. In this skill's context that behavior is expected, but it is still security-relevant because monitoring terms and returned results may reveal confidential brand monitoring activity or other sensitive business context if users are not warned.
- Content
REST API fallback:
bash curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tiktok-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{ "keywords": ["#[brand]", "#[brand]review", "#[brand]honest"], "maxItems": 200 }'
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 84% confidence
- Finding
The skill explicitly posts user-supplied search keywords to an external Apify endpoint, which constitutes third-party data transmission. In this skill's context that behavior is expected, but it is still security-relevant because monitoring terms and returned results may reveal confidential brand monitoring activity or other sensitive business context if users are not warned.
- Content
REST API fallback:
bash curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tiktok-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{ "keywords": ["#[brand]", "#[brand]review", "#[brand]honest"], "maxItems": 200 }'
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.