finding-marketing-professionals-on-twitter

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 11:24 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill matches its recruiting purpose, but it needs review because it sends recruiting searches and candidate handles to Apify and its REST examples put the Apify token in URL query strings.

Review before installing. Use this only when you intend to send recruiting search criteria and candidate handles to Apify. Prefer an Apify MCP or API method that keeps the token in an Authorization header, use a least-privilege token, set explicit maxItems limits, and avoid scraping or storing more candidate data than needed.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:90

Finding

Apify API Token Exposed in Tweet Scraper Request URL

Content

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Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:108

Finding

Apify API Token Exposed in User Scraper Request URL

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The trigger description enumerates many loosely related recruiting intents and social-search scenarios without clear activation constraints. Overbroad triggers can cause the skill to activate on ambiguous user requests and initiate external social-media scraping or candidate profiling when the user did not clearly intend that behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The documentation instructs sending search terms and usernames to Apify actors, but it does not require an explicit disclosure or consent step before transmitting potentially sensitive search criteria or personal identifiers to a third party. In a recruiting context, this can expose hiring intentions, targeted individuals, or internal sourcing criteria to an external service without informed user approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This command sends search terms directly to an external Apify endpoint, creating a clear outbound data flow to a third party. In this skill's recruiting context, the transmitted queries can reveal sensitive business intent such as active hiring plans, target roles, or sourcing strategy, and the documentation does not require prior user consent or data minimization.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

REST API fallback:

bash

curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"searchTerms": ["growth marketer", "VP Marketing", "marketing open to work", "content marketing jobs"], "maxItems": 300}'

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

REST API fallback:

bash

curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"searchTerms": ["growth marketer", "VP Marketing", "marketing open to work", "content marketing jobs"], "maxItems": 300}'

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This API example transmits a list of usernames to a third-party service for profile enrichment. Even though the usernames are public identifiers, sending targeted candidate lists to an external processor can disclose recruitment targets and create privacy/compliance concerns, especially when combined with profile scoring and open-to-work inference.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

REST API fallback:

bash

curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~twitter-user-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"usernames": ["handle1", "handle2"]}'

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The example input sets "tweetLanguage": "en", which enforces an English-only search scope. The document does not present this as optional or offer the user a language choice, creating a locale/language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.