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Security audit

building-twitter-prospect-lists

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it says, but it automates collection and export of identifiable X/Twitter prospect data without enough privacy, platform-terms, retention, or vendor-processing guidance.

Install only if your organization permits X/Twitter scraping and third-party Apify processing for prospecting. Before use, set limits on list size, avoid sensitive-category targeting, confirm platform and privacy-law obligations, store exports only in approved locations, and delete prospect files according to a defined retention policy.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill is explicitly designed to scrape, compile, and export identifiable Twitter/X profile data for outreach, but it provides no warning about privacy, platform terms, consent, retention, or downstream handling of prospect data. In this context, the omission increases the risk of non-compliant collection and use of personal data at scale, especially for sales targeting.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill includes commands that automatically save scraped prospect data to CSV/JSON files, but it does not warn that these files may contain sensitive business intelligence or personal data that can persist on disk, be synced to cloud storage, or be exposed through weak local access controls. This makes inadvertent data leakage more likely in normal use.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**If Apify MCP is not available:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~tweet-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This command transmits user-supplied search terms and scraping instructions to a third-party service (Apify), which is an external data transfer. Even if operationally necessary, the skill does not disclose what data is sent, what logs may be retained by the provider, or the compliance implications of sending targeting criteria and scraped content off-platform.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**If Apify MCP is not available:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~twitter-user-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "usernames": ["[username1]", "[username2]"]
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This command sends a batch of usernames to an external scraping actor for enrichment, creating another third-party data transfer involving identifiable account data and prospecting activity. In the context of lead generation, this is more sensitive because it operationalizes profile enrichment without any notice about external processing, provider trust, or handling limits.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**If Apify MCP is not available:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~twitter-user-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "usernames": ["[username1]", "[username2]"]
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This command sends a batch of usernames to an external scraping actor for enrichment, creating another third-party data transfer involving identifiable account data and prospecting activity. In the context of lead generation, this is more sensitive because it operationalizes profile enrichment without any notice about external processing, provider trust, or handling limits.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.