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Security audit

benchmarking-instagram-influencer-engagement

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill uses Apify to scrape public Instagram account data for engagement benchmarking, and the external API use is purpose-aligned and visible in the instructions.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the Instagram handles you analyze, request metadata, and scraper activity to Apify/Apidojo. Store APIFY_TOKEN as a secret environment variable, avoid pasting it into prompts or files, and review Apify billing and data-handling terms before using the scraper.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill sends Instagram handles and related query parameters to Apify/Apidojo, but the description does not clearly warn users that their requested targets and analysis inputs are transmitted to a third-party scraping service. This creates a transparency and privacy risk because users may disclose account lists or campaign research targets without informed consent about external processing.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~instagram-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The REST fallback explicitly transmits usernames and an API token to api.apify.com, which is a real external data transfer boundary. In this skill context, external transmission is expected for functionality, but it is still security-relevant because user-supplied account lists and authentication data leave the local environment and are processed by a third party.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**REST API fallback:**
```bash
curl -X POST \
  "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/apidojo~instagram-scraper/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "usernames": ["[handle1]", "[handle2]"],
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The hardcoded Apify endpoint confirms outbound network transmission to an external service, which exposes user-requested handles and request metadata to a third party. While this is aligned with the skill's purpose, the risk remains because users may not realize that analysis requests are leaving the system and could be logged or retained externally.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
Referencing APIFY_TOKEN without warning that it is a credential for authenticated third-party access can mislead users about the sensitivity of the secret and how it will be used. This increases the chance of mishandling credentials or supplying them without understanding they authorize billable external actions against a third-party service.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.