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Security audit

amazon-competitor-intelligence-monitor

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently performs disclosed Amazon competitor analysis through ZooData, with expected API-key, credit-use, and local monitoring-state considerations.

Install only if you intend to use ZooData for Amazon competitor research and are comfortable sending ASINs, keywords, category paths, marketplace/date values, and numeric filters to ZooData. Prefer ZOODATA_API_KEY in your environment over the optional ~/.zoodata/config.json file, watch credit estimates before broad scans, and only enable scheduled monitoring when you want recurring API use and local baseline/history files.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
The skill is presented as a narrowly scoped competitor-monitoring tool, but the documented command surface and workflows enable substantially broader data collection and analysis, including category-wide market analysis, keyword intelligence, review extraction, and credential/self-check operations. This scope mismatch is dangerous because users, policy engines, or orchestration layers may grant or invoke the skill under narrower assumptions than its actual behavior, increasing the chance of over-collection, unintended API spend, or misuse outside the user's expected consent boundary.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
print("    export ZOODATA_API_KEY='hms_live_yourkey'", file=sys.stderr)
    print("", file=sys.stderr)
    print("  Method 2: User-home config (persistent, shared across all skills)", file=sys.stderr)
    print("    mkdir -p ~/.zoodata && chmod 700 ~/.zoodata", file=sys.stderr)
    print('    (umask 077; echo \'{"api_key":"hms_live_yourkey"}\' > ~/.zoodata/config.json)', file=sys.stderr)
    print("    # keep the file private (0600) — it holds a bearer credential", file=sys.stderr)
    print("", file=sys.stderr)
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The script instructs users to store a long-lived bearer credential in ~/.zoodata/config.json, creating persistent session material on disk shared across all skills. Even though the guidance recommends restrictive file permissions, any later local compromise, backup leak, or overly broad multi-skill trust model could expose the token and enable unauthorized API use.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.