Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed ClawEC API helper for TikTok category research, with expected outbound API use and no hidden persistence or destructive behavior.
Install only if you are comfortable sending search keywords, selected TikTok region, table preference, and your ClawEC bearer token to clawec.com. Use a dedicated API key with normal rotation practices, avoid putting sensitive private data in keywords, and review API costs or point usage before enabling table output.
The skill documents shell-based execution paths (curl and bash scripts/analyze.sh) but does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization gap where an agent may invoke shell/network capabilities more broadly than intended, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or data egress during use.
The skill instructs sending user-supplied keywords and an authorization bearer token to an external third-party API endpoint. External transmission is expected for this skill's purpose, but it still creates a real data egress and credential-handling risk, especially if users are not clearly informed or if sensitive inputs are sent without minimization.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/product_search_v2" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWEC_API_KEY" \
-d '{"keyword":"wireless earbuds","target_platform":"tiktok","region":"ID","table":0}'
The instructions explicitly require the skill to '输出中文机会分析报告' and describe the output as '默认中文报告' without indicating that the user may choose another language. This is a natural-language locale policy issue because it imposes a specific language by default rather than offering opt-in or adaptation to user preference.
Line L72 instructs that fields with UP/DOWN prefixes should be translated into Chinese, which imposes a specific language behavior. Under the policy, forcing a language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The script defaults REGION to "ID" when the user does not supply a region, which imposes a locale-specific behavior automatically. There is no accompanying natural-language explanation, opt-in, or indication that this regional default is required for a justified region-specific use case.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"table": int(sys.argv[3]),
}))' "$KEYWORD" "$REGION" "$TABLE")
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/product_search_v2" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-d "$PAYLOAD"
The script performs an HTTP POST to an external service, transmitting the user-provided keyword, region, table selection, and an authorization bearer token. There is no confirmation prompt, logging, comment, or docstring disclosing this outbound data transmission to the user within the file.
No suspicious patterns detected.