Undeclared Tool Scope
- Category
- MCP Least Privilege
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward Temu product-search integration that sends a user-provided keyword to Clawec's API using a user-supplied API key.
Install this only if you are comfortable sending Temu search keywords to Clawec and using a Clawec API key. Avoid entering confidential product plans, customer names, or proprietary sourcing terms unless Clawec is an approved provider for that data.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The skill sends user-provided search keywords and an API bearer token to an external third-party service. External transmission is expected for a product-search integration, but it still creates real data exposure risk if users supply sensitive business terms, proprietary research queries, or if the API key is mishandled/logged; the context makes this less suspicious than a random exfiltration flow, but it remains a genuine security consideration.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/temu_search" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWEC_API_KEY" \
-d '{"keyword":"蓝牙耳机"}'
This script sends data and an authorization bearer token to an external service, creating a trust boundary crossing that can affect confidentiality and operational security. In the context of a product-search skill this behavior is expected, but it still becomes risky if users are unaware that search terms may reveal sensitive sourcing strategy or if the external provider is not properly vetted.
PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps({"keyword": sys.argv[1]}))' "$KEYWORD")
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/temu_search" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-d "$PAYLOAD"
The script transmits user-supplied search terms to a third-party API, but provides no user-facing notice, consent prompt, or documentation at the point of use. While sending the keyword is functionally necessary for a search skill, undisclosed external transmission can expose potentially sensitive product research, customer data, or proprietary business intent.
The markdown instructs that responses should use a default Chinese summary, which imposes a language preference without explicit user opt-in. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language is a natural-language policy concern unless the skill offers a choice or clearly justifies the constraint.
This markdown file contains all user-facing documentation in Chinese and does not indicate that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the policy for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy issue.
The script's usage and error messages are presented only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or explanation. This is a natural-language locale policy concern because the file does not offer alternatives or document why Chinese-only messaging is required.