Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a narrowly scoped Shopee shop-detail lookup integration that discloses its ClawEC API use and does not show hidden persistence, destructive behavior, or unrelated data access.
Install only if you are comfortable sending Shopee shop IDs, site/date query details, and your ClawEC API bearer token to ClawEC. Prefer storing the key in CLAWEC_API_KEY, avoid pasting keys into chat or logs, and review the provider's terms before using it for sensitive business research.
The skill includes shell-based execution examples and references a local script, but it does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools restrictions. This creates an authorization gap where an agent may invoke shell capabilities more broadly than intended, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or data handling beyond the minimum required for the task.
The skill directs the agent to transmit user-supplied shop identifiers and an API bearer token to an external third-party service. External transmission is expected for this integration, but it remains security-relevant because it moves potentially sensitive business query data and credentials outside the local trust boundary; the risk is higher because the skill is specifically designed around third-party API access.
单个店铺：
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/shopee/data/shop/detail" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWEC_API_KEY" \
-d '{"site":"tw","shopIds":"12345678"}'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
print(json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False))
' "$SITE" "$SHOP_IDS" "$TIMEST")
curl -s -X POST "https://www.clawec.com/api/aigc/ec/shopee/data/shop/detail" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-d "$PAYLOAD"
This shell script sends the provided site and shopIds payload to a remote HTTPS endpoint and includes a bearer token from an environment variable, but there is no confirmation prompt, user-facing log, or explanatory comment/docstring warning that data will be transmitted externally. For a code file, outbound network calls carrying user/system data and credentials should have some visible disclosure unless clearly communicated elsewhere.
The markdown states '默认中文报告' as the default reporting language, which is a natural-language locale constraint. The file does not indicate that users can choose another language or explicitly opt into Chinese output, so this conflicts with the policy against forcing a specific language without user opt-in.
The parsing guidance says numeric fields should be converted to Chinese labels before display, which imposes a specific output language. The file does not offer a user language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-language context.
The usage and error messages are hard-coded in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on all users without opt-in. The policy allows locale constraints when clearly documented and justified, but this file provides no such explanation or alternative.