T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/encryption-service.js:17- Finding
Ambiguous Tenant Context Construction Allows Cross-Tenant Key Collisions
- Content
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"a:b:c" userId = "a", channelId = "b:c" -> "a:b:c" ``` The resulting context is subsequently used to index: - In-memory master keys - In-memory key-encryption keys - In-memory data-encryption keys - Persistent salts - Wrapped KEKs - Wrapped DEKs - Non-asset encrypted records Consequently, logically distinct tenants can be mapped to the same cryptographic and storage namespace. The implementation does not independently verify that a context belongs to the authenticated caller. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker identifies or predicts a victim's `userId` and `channelId`. 2. The attacker supplies a crafted identifier containing `:` so that the attacker's identifier pair produces the same context string as the victim's pair. 3. The attacker invokes `unlock`, `save`, `load`, or encryption operations using the colliding identifiers. 4. If the colliding context is already unlocked in the same process, the service retrieves KEKs and DEKs from the shared in-memory maps. 5. The attacker can then target matching scopes and record keys in the shared namespace. 6. Depending on context state and operation order, the attacker may read or overwrite victim records, reuse active cryptographic material, or replace initialization data and deny the victim access. ### Impact Assessment A successful collision breaks the adv ...[truncated 622 chars]- Remediation
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