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Security audit

transfer-consciousness

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a small instruction-only skill for coordinating agent handoffs, with clear limits around credentials, ownership, and persistence.

Before installing, prefer a pinned or manually reviewed copy of the skill rather than running an unpinned npx command. When using it, only transfer explicitly relevant project files, do not include secrets or session material, and require a clear ownership cutover so two agents do not write to the same work at once.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:10
Finding
Unpinned Package Execution During Installation<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 10–12 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash npx skills add AntreasAntoniou/transfer-consciousness ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command invokes `npx` without pinning the `skills` package to a reviewed, immutable version. Depending on the local environment and cache state, `npx` can retrieve and execute the package version currently resolved by the package registry. The Skill repository reference, `AntreasAntoniou/transfer-consciousness`, is also not pinned to an immutable commit. Therefore, both the installer behavior and the installed Skill content may change after the audited snapshot without corresponding modifications to this repository. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which mutable third-party content is executed during installation. Exploitation would require compromise or malicious replacement of the resolved package, its publishing account, the distribution channel, or the mutable repository content. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, package registry distribution path, repository account, or another component controlling the mutable dependency. 2. The attacker publishes or substitutes a malicious version of the `skills` package or modifies the repository content referenced by the installation command. 3. A user follows the README and runs: ```bash npx skills add AntreasAntoniou/transfer-consciousness ``` 4. `npx` resolves and executes the unpinned installer package. 5. The installer retrieves or installs mutable repository content controlled by the compromised source. 6. Malicious code can execute under the account and environment used to run the installation command. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running `npx`. Potential consequences include modif ...[truncated 434 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the installer package to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on mutable package resolution: ```bash npx --yes skills@&lt;reviewed-exact-version&gt; add &lt;immutable-source-reference&gt; ``` 2. Pin the Skill source to an immutable commit hash or signed release instead of a mutable branch or repository head. 3. Publish expected checksums or signatures for release artifacts and instruct users to verify them before installation. 4. Document the package registry, publisher identity, reviewed version, and provenance of the installer. 5. Prefer a manual installation option that downloads a fixed release artifact, verifies its integrity, and copies reviewed files without executing a remotely resolved installer. 6. Use lockfiles, signed release tags, protected publishing credentials, and reproducible release procedures where supported. 7. Avoid recommending elevated privileges for installation; run the installer with the least-privileged account and within an appropriately restricted environment. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.