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Security audit

Web Scraper - Firecrawl

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Firecrawl skill uses a disclosed third-party scraping API for its stated purpose, with privacy cautions but no evidence of hidden or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending target URLs, extraction prompts, schemas, and scraped content to Firecrawl. Avoid using it on internal, authenticated, regulated, or confidential pages unless you have approval, and keep FIRECRAWL_API_KEY scoped and protected.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.getenv (line 45, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/firecrawl.py (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

python
method=method
            )
        
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as response:
            return json.loads(response.read().decode())
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        print(f"API Error: {e.code} {e.reason}")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises and documents capabilities that require environment access, file read/write, and outbound network access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This increases the risk of over-broad execution in agent environments because users and orchestrators cannot easily tell what resources the skill is expected to access, making misuse or accidental data exposure more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill sends user-provided URLs and retrieved page content to an external third-party service, but the description does not clearly warn users about that data transfer. In practice, users may submit internal URLs, sensitive pages, or proprietary content without realizing it will be transmitted to Firecrawl, creating privacy, confidentiality, and compliance risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/firecrawl.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
# API Configuration
FIRECRAWL_API_KEY = os.getenv("FIRECRAWL_API_KEY", "")
FIRECRAWL_BASE_URL = "https://api.firecrawl.dev/v1"


def make_api_request(endpoint: str, data: dict = None, method: str = "POST") -> dict:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This CLI transmits user-supplied URLs, extraction prompts, and schemas to a third-party service without an explicit disclosure or consent mechanism at execution time. In an agent skill context, users may assume local processing; sending internal URLs, proprietary page content, or sensitive extraction instructions to an external vendor can create unintended data exposure and privacy/compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.