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Security audit

Synap

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed connector for storing and retrieving agent knowledge in a Synap pod, with expected remote storage and write authority for that purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable with your agent storing facts, documents, relationships, and relayed channel messages in the configured Synap pod. Use least-privilege API keys where available, review managed-pod privacy expectations, and configure governance so important business data changes require review.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (10)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

bash
git clone https://github.com/synap-core/backend && cd backend/deploy
cp .env.example .env
docker compose up -d
# Visit https://your-domain/registration to create account
./setup-openclaw.sh

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

GET /api/hub/memory?userId={UID}&query=Marc+preferences&limit=10

DELETE /api/hub/memory/?userId={UID}

text

### Create & Update

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 204)May include surrounding context.

md
"sourceEntityId": "<id>", "targetEntityId": "<id>", "type": "related",
  "reasoning": "Marc works at Acme Corp" }

DELETE /api/hub/relations/<id>
{ "userId": "{UID}", "agentUserId": "{UID}", "workspaceId": "{WID}" }

POST /api/hub/profiles

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README advertises message relay from third-party platforms and remote API-key-based connectivity, but it does not warn users that messages, documents, facts, and other agent data may be transmitted to and stored on a remote Synap pod. In an agent skill context, missing disclosure can lead to unintended exfiltration of sensitive chat content, credentials, or long-term memory to external infrastructure, especially when managed hosting is encouraged.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to relay third-party messages from external platforms into Synap and trigger Synap AI processing, but it does not require a clear user-facing consent or privacy warning before transmitting that content. This creates a real data-handling risk because messages from Telegram, WhatsApp, or Slack may contain sensitive personal or business information that is forwarded to another system for storage and automated processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Recall** — search across everything by keyword, type, or semantic similarity
3. **Relay** — bring external messages (Telegram, WhatsApp, Slack) into Synap and let the Synap AI process them

Every write goes through governance — some auto-approve, others create proposals
for the user to review. You never lose data. You never need to organize it.

---

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 276)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Recall** — search across everything by keyword, type, or semantic similarity
3. **Relay** — bring external messages (Telegram, WhatsApp, Slack) into Synap and let the Synap AI process them

Every write goes through governance — some auto-approve, others create proposals
for the user to review. You never lose data. You never need to organize it.

---

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

md
| Situation                          | Action                                                  | Primitive |
| ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
| "Remember that Marc prefers email" | `POST /api/hub/memory`                                  | Fact      |
| "Create a task to follow up"       | `POST /api/hub/entities`                                | Entity    |
| "Write a meeting summary"          | `POST /api/hub/documents`                               | Document  |
| "Marc works at Acme Corp"          | Create person + company, then `POST /api/hub/relations` | Relation  |
| "What do I know about Marc?"       | `GET /api/hub/search?query=Marc`                        | Search    |

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

md
## Governance

### Auto-approved:

- All reads and searches
- Memory storage/recall

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 289)May include surrounding context.

md
## Governance

### Auto-approved:

- All reads and searches
- Memory storage/recall

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.